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WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT:
EIGHTH AMENDMENT HABEAS CLAIMS DURING COVID-19
Michael L. Zuckerman*

INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a lawyer with clients inside a prison under which a
sinkhole has just opened. The prison is slowly sinking into the ground
and filling with water. Though the prison is attempting to pump out
excess water, the water level is projected to rise some five or so feet over
the coming weeks.
Some of the people incarcerated at the prison are taller and know how
to swim, which suggests that they will be unlikely to drown to death,
though their imprisonment will become more uncomfortable than usual.
Some are shorter or do not know how to swim, which suggests that they
will be more likely to drown to death—though, of course, it is possible
that some or even many of these people will also survive.
You are alarmed that the prison is not moving these people out of the
sinking prison. But when you complain about the danger, the Warden
responds that the prisoners were all validly convicted and sentenced and
that the prison staff are working hard to mitigate the water-level rise by
pumping out the excess water. They are also providing the prisoners with
flotation devices in the meantime.
You have heard reports from your clients that these measures have not
been as widely implemented as the Warden claims. But you are also not
convinced that, even if these measures are implemented as promised, they
are effective enough to protect your clients from a substantial risk of
serious harm. Simply being incarcerated in this sinking prison itself, you
might think, violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.
What do you do?
You may do something similar to what a small constellation of lawyers
around the country (myself included) tried to do as the novel coronavirus,
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COVID-19, spread rapidly in state and federal prisons, jails, and other
detention facilities. In this Article, I tell the story of eight major cases
involving COVID-19 in prisons and discuss the legal issues and tensions
that arose from these cases. The overall trajectory of these cases is
dispiriting: a foreseeable risk to the health and lives of people whose
wellbeing is at the mercy of the state became an unnecessary disaster,
with hundreds of thousands of prisoners infected by the spring of 2021
and more than two thousand dead.
My goals in this Article are threefold. First, I hope to provide a starting
point for practitioners or incarcerated people who may find themselves
litigating similar issues in the future—seeking release from confinement
that itself violates the Eighth Amendment. Because these issues are
complex and inherently urgent, there is rarely the luxury of extended
doctrinal research.1
Second, I hope to make a record of what transpired before the world
moves on and these cases are lost to the sands of Westlaw and Lexis.
Chronicling what has happened—even (or especially) when one disagrees
with the results—is valuable in and of itself.2
Third, I offer a critical analysis of the cases themselves and the doctrine
involved. While the cases hinged on an unprecedented factual
backdrop—a worldwide pandemic—the doctrinal tensions that arose and
the trends that the cases followed are by no means unique. Rather, they
cast in harsher relief much that was already true about mass incarceration
in the United States and the law that confronts those who wish to make
the system more humane. The conditions of incarceration are bad, and in
virtually all cases throughout our “carceral archipelago,”3 they put people
at much graver risk of harm than they would otherwise face.4 The
procedural and substantive hurdles to remedying those risks through
1. In doing so, I do not write on a blank slate. See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in
the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2020); Sharon Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet
COVID-19, 11/16/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 4; Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice,
109 CALIF. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2021); Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 71 (2020); Developments in the Law — Conditions of Confinement, Covid-19, and the CDC,
134 HARV. L. REV. 2233 (2021). I had submitted a full draft of this piece before learning of Professors
Garrett and Kovarsky’s forthcoming Article, so I distinguish at a few points within where I later drew on
their work, where I independently came to a similar conclusion, and where I respectfully part ways with
their analysis.
2. Cf. Hon. Bernice B. Donald, Judicial Independent, Collegiality, and the Problem of Dissent
in Multi-Member Courts, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317, 329–30 (2019) (discussing and collecting sources
addressing the value of dissenting opinions as keeping alive the possibility of persuading a majority in the
future).
3. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 298 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books
1977) (1975).
4. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 886–89 (2009); Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151,
152–153 (2020).
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litigation are tall to begin with, and they sometimes seem to grow taller
when even the existing rules would seem to dictate victory for the
plaintiffs.5 Given the unparalleled size and scope of American
incarceration, the stakes of such an unforgiving doctrinal landscape are
immense.6
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a brief overview of the
legal landscape as COVID-19 arose—both the barriers to successful
claims by incarcerated people and the (limited) legal paths to
decarceration that were available. Part II surveys recent jurisprudential
history, detailing eight prominent federal cases involving Eighth
Amendment claims arising out of COVID-19 outbreaks at carceral
facilities, most of which involved in-depth litigation over the availability
of release via habeas corpus. Part III, the heart of the Article, discusses
the key tensions raised by these cases—each a potential stumbling block
for courts and litigants. Specifically, Part III addresses: (A) the
interaction between habeas, classic “conditions of confinement” cases,
and the relevant legal constraints on each type of suit; (B) the nature of
Eight Amendment “deliberate indifference” under these circumstances;
(C) what procedural devices, such as class-wide representation, are proper
for adjudicating these claims in an efficient and effective way; (D)
federalism and comity concerns that arise when the institution at issue is
a state facility and how these concerns may cash out through exhaustion
requirements; (E) unsettled questions regarding temporary release as a
form of preliminary versus final relief; and (F) the relationship between
rights and remedies in this context. Part IV proposes statutory and
jurisprudential solutions to these tensions and concludes.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AS THE CRISIS UNFOLDED
Prisoners in this country don’t have many good years, but 1996 was an
especially bad one.7 That was the year that both the Antiterrorism and
5. See, e.g., Godfrey, supra note 4, at 155, 171–74; Dolovich, supra note 4, at 895–907; see also
Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 43–53 (coming to a similar conclusion).
6. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 816 (2017) (noting that the United States incarcerates roughly 2.2 million
people, “more than any other country on Earth,” and, “[w]ith just 5% of the world’s
population, . . . incarcerates nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners”). It bears emphasizing, too, that “[m]ass
incarceration has not touched all communities equally,” but rather includes substantial racial disparities.
See
generally
THE
SENTENCING
PROJECT,
Criminal
Justice
Facts,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/. “Black men are six times as likely to be
incarcerated as white men,” for example, “and Latinos are more than 2.5 times as likely.” Id. This means,
of course, that carceral infections will also disproportionately affect racial minorities, given that they are
incarcerated at disproportionate rates to begin with.
7. Where I do so, I use the term “prisoners” with awareness that there is a range of feelings, most
centrally among incarcerated people themselves, about this and other labels. See generally Blair Hickman,
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Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)8 and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) came into full force.9 These Colossus cousins now stand
astride the two main courthouse doors open to U.S. prisoners. Neither is
welcoming.
2020 was also an especially bad year—it was the year that COVID-19
swept through the nation’s jails, prisons, and detention facilities.10 As of
September 2020, the known prisoner fatality rate was twice as high as the
broader public rate.11 As of late December 2020, at least 275,000
prisoners had tested positive, a number that equates roughly to one in five
Inmate.
Prisoner.
Other.
Discussed., MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2015, 7:15 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/03/inmate-prisoner-other-discussed (collecting reported
preferences and thoughts from incarcerated and non-incarcerated respondents). In keeping with at least
one plurality’s preference, id., and my own inclination, I primarily use “incarcerated person” or
“incarcerated people” when speaking at a high level of generality. Where, as in this piece, I seek to
distinguish between people incarcerated in prisons specifically—as opposed to incarcerated in jails (where
they may be detained pretrial and legally innocent) or immigration detention facilities—I use the word
“prisoner” to communicate that more specific meaning. When quoting other authors, I retain whatever
terminology these authors use (the words themselves being a form of data). See also Akiba Solomon,
What Words We Use–and Avoid–When Covering People and Incarceration, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr.
12, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/04/12/what-words-we-use-and-avoidwhen-covering-people-and-incarceration.
In some instances, I use the word “prisoner” because I fear the risk of sanitizing that comes
with more progressive terms. The millions of people our society has chosen to incarcerate are much more
than prisoners, but we should not allow ourselves to look away from, or sand the edges off, the fact that
we have also made them prisoners, in many cases when there was no good reason to do so. See generally,
e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD (2017); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); RUTH
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG (2007); ABBE SMITH, GUILTY PEOPLE (2020); Guyora Binder & Ben
Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2017); Allegra M.
McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Editorial Board, America Is Letting the Coronavirus Rage Through
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/opinion/sunday/
coronavirus-prisons-jails.html.
11. KEVIN T. SCHNEPEL, COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COVID-19 IN U.S. STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISONS 3 (Sept. 2020). Some skeptics protest that incarcerated people may be more likely to
come from communities that have sustained high COVID-19 infection rates, and that therefore they might
still be safer in prison; I have seen at least a few prosecutors offer such speculations. But these assertions
ignore the degree to which prisons themselves may contribute to extramural spread, and the fact that the
calculation cited above already accounts for several variables—including state, age, and race/ethnicity,
id. at 6—gives further cause (especially under conditions of de facto segregation) to conclude that this
skepticism is misguided. See Jordan Wilkie, Prisons Contribute to Racial Imbalance in COVID-19 Impact
in NC, CAROLINA PUB. PRESS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://carolinapublicpress.org/42342/prisons-contributeto-racial-imbalance-in-covid-19-impact-in-nc. More fundamentally, however, the prisoners-are-safer
argument fails to account for the moral significance of the state taking away a person’s ability to make
his own health-related choices and instead subjecting him to a situation that poses a particular risk of
infection and death. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989); cf. Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology,
and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 756–74 (2005). (Like others, I use male pronouns where
necessary because most people incarcerated in the United States are men. See, e.g., Godfrey, supra note
4, at 153 n.12.)
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prisoners—a rate that is, in turn, four times that of the broader population
yet still likely “a vast undercount.”12 By March 29, 2021, that number
exceeded 390,000 cases.13 Over two thousand prisoners have died.14
Little more needs to be said about the dangers of COVID-19, which
has dominated much of the year’s discourse. The core, largely undisputed
facts relevant to incarcerated people are: (1) that COVID-19 is a highly
infectious respiratory disease that especially afflicts older people and
people with certain health conditions, both of which are groups that
represent a growing share of prisoners; (2) that in the absence of a vaccine
or effective therapy, the only effective way to avoid transmission is to
engage in social distancing; and (3) that prisons, like cruise ships and
nursing homes, are the kind of congregate environments that are
especially susceptible to rapid and unchecked COVID-19 transmission.15
Everyone who was paying attention feared that COVID-19‘s arrival
would be catastrophic for incarcerated people.16 And the data above
show, those fears have largely been confirmed.17

12. See Beth Schwartzapfel et al., 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. Has Had COVID-19, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-shas-had-covid-19.
13. A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2021). The Marshall Project stopped collecting this data in June 2021. Id. For more recent
data, see COVID PRISON PROJECT, https://covidprisonproject.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
14. MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 13 (as of Mar. 29, 2021); see also COVID PRISON PROJECT,
supra note 13. By that time, COVID-19 had already killed more prisoners than have been executed under
the modern death penalty. Doug Berman, The New Death Penalty: COVID Has Now Killed in Nine
Months More U.S. Prisoners Than Capital Punishment over Last 50+ Years, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y
BLOG (Dec. 5, 2020), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/12/the-newdeath-penalty-covid-has-now-killed-in-nine-months-more-us-prisoners-than-capital-punishment-.html.
15. E.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19):
Guidance for Correctional & Detention Facilities, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2021);
Andre G. Montoya-Barthelemy et al., COVID-19 and the Correctional Environment: The American
Prison as a Focal Point for Public Health, 58 AM. J. PREV. MED. 888 (2020); Weihua Li & Nicole Lewis,
This Chart Shows Why The Prison Population Is So Vulnerable to COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar.
19, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/19/this-chart-shows-why-the-prisonpopulation-is-so-vulnerable-to-covid-19. Because the litigation on which this Article focuses predates the
availability of a COVID-19 vaccine, I cabin my discussion accordingly.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Prisons are
tinderboxes for infectious disease. The question whether the government can protect inmates from
COVID-19 is being answered every day, as outbreaks appear in new facilities.”); Danielle Ivory, We Are
Not a Hospital: A Prison Braces for the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/coronavirus-prisons-jails.html; Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter
of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion/coronavirus-in-jails.html; Li & Lewis, supra note 15.
17. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. One potential countervailing shift is that
courts at least temporarily slowed the rates at which they were sending people to prisons; the federal
prison population, ended 2020 at a “new modern low of 152,184.” See Doug Berman, Federal Prison
Population Closes Out 2020 at New Modern Low of 152,184 According to BOP, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y
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This Part provides a brief overview of the legal landscape as the
COVID-19 pandemic took root, focusing on (A) AEDPA’s legal barriers
to bringing successful federal habeas corpus claims, (B) the PLRA’s legal
barriers to bringing successful prison-conditions claims, and (C) legal
provisions authorizing prisoner release that were or became available as
the pandemic emerged.
A. Habeas Corpus and AEPDA
“[T]he traditional function of” the writ of habeas corpus “is to secure
release from illegal custody.”18 Federal law allows any district court,
acting within its “respective jurisdiction,”19 to grant a writ of habeas
corpus whenever a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.”20 Such a “court shall summarily
hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice
require.”21
That is capacious statutory text. It has, of course, been substantially
cabined—sometimes by Congress, sometimes by federal courts—in many
classic habeas scenarios. For example, state prisoners seeking to
challenge the validity of their convictions or sentences are subject to the
restrictions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, which include an automatic
prohibition on repeated claims,22 automatic forfeiture of many (though
not all) claims not presented in an earlier habeas petition,23 mandatory
exhaustion of available and effective state remedies,24 and an extremely
high bar for review, requiring either a profound error by the last state court
to review the prisoner’s case on the merits or a basis in constitutional
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2020), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/12/federalprison-population-closes-out-2020-at-new-modern-low-of-152184-according-to-bop.html. Some jails
and local courts took at least provisional steps to reduce the number of people detained pretrial or
incarcerated for misdemeanors and other low-level offenses. See generally PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic (May 18, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
virus/virusresponse.html. But the raw numbers still speak for themselves, and the fact that things could
have gone worse does not mean that they went well.
18. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); see also Hamama v. Homan, 912 F.3d 869,
875 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The traditional remedy provided by habeas is ‘removing the injury of unjust and
illegal confinement.’” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
137 (1768))).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
20. Id. § 2241(c)(3).
21. Id. § 2243.
22. Id. § 2244(b)(1).
23. Id. § 2244(b)(2) (with exceptions for (i) new, retroactive constitutional rules recognized by
the Supreme Court and (ii) newly discovered evidence that “could not have been discovered through . . .
due diligence,” so long as these facts plus the overall record would “establish by clear and convincing
evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty”).
24. Id. § 2254(b)(1).
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doctrine newly promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court or newly
available, previously undiscoverable-with-ordinary-diligence facts.25
Similarly, though somewhat less restrictively, while a federal prisoner
“claiming the right to be released upon the ground that [his] sentence was”
illegal or otherwise unjustified may file a petition under § 2255 “to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.”26 These motions are subject to another
set of constraints outlined in § 2255, including a one-year period of
limitations27 and limits on subsequent filings that resemble those imposed
on incarcerated people who were convicted in state court.28
B. Prisoner Civil-Rights Suits and the PLRA
Enacted in the shadow of a high number of prisoner filings, the PLRA,
in theory, was meant to facilitate “fewer and better prisoner suits.” 29 Its
critics have noted that its “new decision standards have imposed new and
very high hurdles so that even constitutionally meritorious cases are often
thrown out of court.”30
The PLRA places multiple constraints on courts whenever they are
asked to issue “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to
prison conditions.”31 For instance, the PLRA proscribes preliminary
injunctive relief unless it is “narrowly drawn,” extends “no further than
necessary to correct the harm,” and is “the least intrusive means necessary
to correct that harm.”32 The law likewise prohibits any “prisoner release
order” until the court has already entered a “less intrusive” order that “has
failed to remedy the deprivation” after a “reasonable amount of time” for
compliance.33 The PLRA also requires that any such release order be
issued by a three-judge court,34 which itself is subject to a strict standard
of review: the court must find, under a clear-and-convincing standard, that
the violation is primarily caused by “crowding” and that no other relief
will suffice.35 On top of that, and more, the statute imposes a strict
25. Id. § 2254(d)–(e).
26. Id. § 2255(a).
27. Id. § 2255(f).
28. See id. § 2255(h).
29. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).
30. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1644 (2003); see Kermit
Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error,
52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1772 n.10 (2003) (collecting sources).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
32. § 3626(a)(2).
33. § 3626(a)(3)(A).
34. § 3626(a)(3)(B).
35. § 3626(a)(3)(E). Read literally, this language would seem to suggest that even a three-judge
court cannot provide for prisoner releases if “crowding” is not the source of the constitutional problem.
As at least one court has noted, that cannot be right. See Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1223–24
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exhaustion requirement.36 The PLRA’s restrictions regarding any “civil
action with respect to prison conditions” do not, however, apply to
“habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of
confinement in prison.”37 As discussed further below, this language came
to the fore in most of the major COVID-19 habeas cases.
C. Release Authorities
Federal prisoners facing COVID-19 were not, however, without
options—nor were judges or executive officials who might have wished
to move them to safety. On the judicial side, federal prisoners can apply
for “compassionate release” by showing that “extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”38 In addition, as discussed
below, they can seek a writ of habeas corpus.
On the executive side, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has
several tools at its disposal. For one, it can grant 30-day furloughs for
medical treatment or “engaging in any other significant activity consistent
with the public interest.”39 Even before COVID-19, it was also
empowered to “conduct a pilot program” for home confinement for
“eligible elderly offenders and eligible terminally ill offenders.” 40 In
addition, the BOP can put prisoners nearing the end of their terms on prerelease home confinement.41
The federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act42 enhanced these powers. Specifically, Congress
provided that, “[d]uring the covered emergency period, if the Attorney
General finds that emergency conditions will materially affect the
functioning of the Bureau, the Director of the Bureau may lengthen the
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[I]magine that a prison were so dilapidated that no one could predict when the walls
would crumble down . . . but that Defendants refused to transfer those inmates despite being aware of that
risk . . . . [C]rowding would not be the cause (let alone the primary cause) of the constitutional violation,
and adopting [such an] interpretation of ‘prisoner release order’ would thus prevent any court — singlejudge or three-judge — from entering a transfer order. . . . This would prevent vindication of the inmates’
constitutional rights and would therefore be impermissible.”). Another court has speculated that “[t]he
reference to ‘crowding’ may have the effect of removing single-plaintiff cases from within the ambit of
Section 3626(a)(3), because an order involving only one inmate might not be viewed as reducing a prison
population in any meaningful way.” Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see, e.g., United States v. Pabon, 458 F. Supp. 3d 296, 300 (E.D.
Pa. 2020) (granting compassionate release to prisoner with significant COVID-19 comorbidities). Certain
federal prisoners can also seek compassionate release when they have reached 70 years of age and served
at least 30 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
39. 18 USC § 3622(a)(3), (6).
40. 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2).
42. Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020).
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maximum amount of time for which the Director is authorized to place a
prisoner in home confinement.”43 On March 26, 2020, Attorney General
Barr directed BOP officials “to prioritize the use of [existing] statutory
authorities to grant home confinement for inmates seeking transfer in
connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.”44 On April 3, 2020,
he issued a follow-up memorandum activating the CARES Act provision
and directing facilities with significant COVID-19 outbreaks (among
them FCI Oakdale, FCI Danbury, and FCI Elkton) “to move with dispatch
in using home confinement, where appropriate, to move vulnerable
inmates out of these institutions.”45
While this Article focuses on litigation in the federal courts (albeit
in many cases regarding state facilities), state courts and state executive
officials were not powerless. In Ohio (where I practice), many state
prisoners are eligible to apply for “judicial release” under state law, at
least so long as they are serving nonmandatory sentences and have served
a required portion of those sentences.46 Most governors, meanwhile, had
the power to grant commutations or reprieves with limited procedural
constraints, which would have allowed them to grant prisoners the ability
to defer the balance of their sentences until it would be safe for those
sentences to resume.47 There have also been significant habeas cases in
state court yielding at least temporary relief under state law.48
43. Id. § 12003(b)(2).
44. William Barr, Memorandum to Director of Bureau of Prisons, Prioritization of Home
Confinement as Appropriate in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/bop_memo_home_confinement.pdf.
45. William Barr, Memorandum to Director of Bureau of Prisons, Increasing Use of Home
Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID-19, at 1 (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/bop_memo_home_confinement_april3.pdf [hereinafter “Barr
Memo”]; see also id. (“Immediately maximize appropriate transfers to home confinement of all
appropriate inmates held at FCI Oakdale, FCI Danbury, FCI Elkton, and at other similarly situated BOP
facilities where COVID-19 is materially affecting operations”). As will become clear later on, these
exhortations went largely unheeded.
46. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.20. For a summary of nascent state efforts to allow for a “second
look” at sentences, see Nazgol Ghandnoosh, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE
(May 12, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/a-second-look-at-injustice/.
47. See Joshua Vaughn, A Rarely Used Power Could Free Prisoners in Pennsylvania. But the
Governor Is Not Using It., THE APPEAL (Mar. 31, 2020), https://theappeal.org/pennsylvania-coronavirusgovernor-prison-reprieves/; Rachel Barkow, Our Leaders Have the Power to Release People in Prison.
Now They Must Use It., THE APPEAL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-prisoncommutations/; Ben Notterman, Reprieves May Be the Smartest Way to Get Virus-Vulnerable People out
of U.S. Prisons, WITNESS LA (Apr. 20, 2020), https://witnessla.com/op-ed-reprieves-may-be-thesmartest-way-to-get-virus-vulnerable-people-out-of-u-s-prisons/; Michael Zuckerman, The Fastest Way
for Gov. DeWine to Save Lives in Ohio Prisons, OHIO CAPITAL JOURNAL (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2020/04/20/the-fast-way-for-gov-dewine-to-save-lives-in-ohio-prisons/.
See generally NYU CENTER ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, USING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
TO
MITIGATE
THE
SPREAD
OF
COVID-19
IN
CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES,
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/adminofcriminallaw/COVID-19 (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
48. See, e.g., In re Von Staich, 56 Cal. App. 5th 53, 84 (2020) (ordering state officials “to
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Many of these tools were inefficient; they required applications,
waiting periods, and sometimes high degrees of individualized analysis,
disproportionate to the speed at which a disease like COVID-19 can move
through a prison.49 And in any event, none was used with the vigor that
prisoners and their loved ones would have hoped for in the face of a
dangerous, rapidly advancing pandemic. For those reasons and others,
prisoners and their attorneys often turned to the federal courts. Part II
surveys eight significant cases and the timeline over which they unfolded.
II. PROMINENT COVID-19 PRISON AND JAIL LITIGATION
COVID-19 litigation in the federal courts raised a number of
complicated legal questions in a novel, urgent context. This Part provides
an illustrative survey of eight prominent cases. It summarizes six cases
in which incarcerated people sought habeas relief based on an asserted
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause: Section A of this Part examines four cases involving prisons, and
therefore, people already convicted of crimes. Section B assesses two
cases involving jails, which house people serving relatively short
sentences and as well as pretrial detainees who were denied or unable to
afford bail. Section C summarizes two cases involving civil-rights claims
for improvements in the conditions of confinement themselves (that is,
non-habeas relief) that nevertheless illustrate important trends in the
relevant Eighth Amendment analysis. Finally, Section D briefly
rehearses the overall timeline. By taking a deeper dive into a smaller
number of cases, this Part seeks to demonstrate for readers focused on the
habeas remedy how the core issues regarding government confinement
and the pandemic played out at a granular level, while also providing
readers more generally with a wider-angle view of how the cases unfolded
and intersected as a group.50 These descriptive summaries also help to tee
immediately commence the design and implementation of plans to expedite release or transfer of the
number of inmates necessary to reduce San Quentin’s population to 50 percent of its June 2020
population”), vacated, Staich on H.C., 477 P.3d 537 (Cal. 2020); Order on Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Writ of Mandate, Campbell v. Barnes, No. 30-2020-01141117 (Cal. Orange Cnty Super. Ct. Dec. 11,
2020) (ordering 50% reduction in population of all congregate areas in Orange County jails). For more
on these pathways, see Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 33–34. Because this Article focuses on
federal habeas claims, I do not delve into these types of cases, though the opportunities may be significant.
49. See generally, e.g., United States v. Osorto, 445 F. Supp. 3d 103 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Breyer, J.)
(providing history and overview of compassionate-release process in pandemic context).
50. My method for picking these cases was not overly scientific—my goal was to cover different
geographies (West, Midwest, South, Northeast); different types of criminal-process-related custody
(prisons and jails); different types of claims (primarily habeas but some non-habeas); and different levels
of success for incarcerated people in intensively lawyered impact litigation involving COVID-19 and the
Eighth Amendment. To that end, the cases I chose include the three that drew writing by members of the
U.S. Supreme Court (Elkton, Valentine, Barnes); the two in which incarcerated people won lasting
victories (Danbury, Lompoc); the first case to draw a lengthy opinion on the possibility of statewide relief
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up the more analytical and normative discussion to which the Article turns
in Part III.
A. Prison Cases
This Section discusses habeas litigation involving four prisons or
prison systems, three of which are federal: FCI/FSL Elkton (litigation in
which I participated), the Illinois prison system, FCI Danbury, and
FCI/USP Lompoc.
1. FCI/FSL Elkton
To begin with the case I know best: the litigation surrounding Elkton,
a low-security facility housing roughly 2,000 federal prisoners located in
Lisbon, Ohio.51 In keeping with its low-security status, Elkton houses
prisoners in “dormitory-style housing units” of 250–300 prisoners;
“[e]ach side of a housing unit contains approximately 150 bunks resulting
in two to three inmates sharing a cube and sleeping a few feet away from
each other.”52 These open-bay conditions make social distancing
impossible. Similarly, other aspects of the facility’s layout ensure that
prisoners will be “in close proximity” when showering, using the
bathroom, picking up meals, or using phones and computers.53
By early April 2020, Elkton was in the midst of a major COVID-19
outbreak;54 it was one of the three federal facilities singled out by
Attorney General Barr for maximal home confinement in his April 3,

(Money); and two others (Cameron, Swain) that, as of August 2021 and not counting the cases already
mentioned, are the most-cited appellate opinions (per Westlaw) issued in this vein between March and
August 2020 (that is, the months during which litigation on these issues was seemingly at its zenith).
There is, of course, no doubt that reasonable minds could substitute a different set. In any event, as in
modernist literature, there is value in zooming in on a smaller number of specific things, without need to
rank relative grandeur. For a higher-level analysis of trends that emerged across the full gamut of cases—
spanning different types of custody (including immigration detention, which I do not discuss), different
judicial forums, and different forms of relief sought—see Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 23–43.
51. See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2020). Technically, Elkton is comprised
of two facilities: FCI Elkton and FSL Elkton. See id. at 832. For simplicity, I use “Elkton” to refer to
both, and some sources use “FCI Elkton” the same way. For a thorough and more normative summary of
the Elkton case, see Dolovich, supra note 1, at 21–24.
52. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 833.
53. See id. at 834–35; see also id. at 840.
54. See Keri Blakinger & Keegan Hamilton, “I Begged Them To Let Me Die”: How Federal
Prisons Became Coronavirus Death Traps, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 18, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/18/i-begged-them-to-let-me-die-how-federal-prisonsbecame-coronavirus-death-traps; Shane Hoover, Fourth Inmate at Ohio Federal Prison in Elkton Dies
from
Coronavirus,
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Apr.
14,
2020,
11:15
AM),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20200414/fourth-inmate-at-ohio-federal-prison-in-elkton-dies-fromcoronavirus.
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2020, memo.55 On April 13, 2020, four prisoners filed a federal suit on
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Elkton prisoners
claiming that these conditions violated the Eighth Amendment.56 They
primarily sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or in the
alternative, injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Eighth
Amendment itself.57 On April 22, 2020, invoking habeas jurisdiction,
Judge James Gwin issued a preliminary injunction.58
At that time, there had been at least 59 prisoner infections, 46 staff
infections, and six prisoner deaths.59 But the infection numbers
themselves were impossible to know for sure because of “shockingly
limited available testing,” as Elkton had “received only 50 COVID-19
swab tests and one Abbott Rapid testing machine with 25 rapid tests.”
Judge Gwin cited “Elkton’s testing debacle” as “one example of th[e]
deliberate indifference” that he concluded the petitioners were likely to
prove.60
Judge Gwin conditionally certified a medically vulnerable subclass of
Elkton prisoners and ordered the prison officials, including the BOP, to
identify all members of the subclass and to evaluate each “for transfer out
of Elkton through any means,” prioritizing review by medical
vulnerability.61 Subclass members deemed “ineligible for compassionate
release, home release, or parole or community supervision” would have
to “be transferred to another BOP facility where appropriate measures,
such as testing and single-cell placement, or social distancing, may be
accomplished.”62 Although these prisoners would “remain in BOP
custody, . . . the conditions of their confinement would be enlarged.”63
The prison officials appealed and sought a stay from the district court
55. Barr Memo, supra note 45, at 1.
56. Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Injunctive, and Declaratory Relief, D.E. 1,
Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-cv-794 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020). This and many other federal-court filings
are available from the University of Michigan Law School’s online Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse,
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
57. See id. at 3–4.
58. Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated, 961 F.3d 829.
59. Id. at 471, 480.
60. Id. at 479. As explained further below, see infra notes 312–317, the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits prison officials from being deliberately indifferent to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Supreme Court has
held that this standard requires both objective and subjective indifference—both an actual, substantial risk
and a conscious disregard of that risk by the officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837, 840
(1994).
61. Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 481.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 480–81. Previously in the order, Judge Gwin explained that enlargement was “not
release, although some courts refer to it using the terms release or bail,” but rather separate use of inherent
judicial power to alter “the place of custody.” Id. at 474. For discussion of the enlargement power, see
Section III.E, infra.
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and the Sixth Circuit. Both courts denied those requests, with the Sixth
Circuit denial coming on May 4, 2020.64
Compliance with the district court’s order, however, was halting. On
May 6, 2020, the prisoners filed a Motion for Enforcement with the
district court. On May 19, 2020, Judge Gwin granted that motion,65
noting that Elkton had still conducted only 524 total tests 66 and stating
that the prison officials had been “thumbing their nose at their authority
to authorize home confinement.”67 Judge Gwin ordered the officials “to
make full use of” home confinement “beyond the paltry grants” it had
made so far, including eliminating certain automatic bars and
disregarding other factors, such as low or moderate incident reports, that
had led to prior denials.68 He also ordered detailed explanations for any
continued denials,69 responses to pending compassionate-release
applications “within 7 days on a continuing basis,”70 and an explanation
showing cause within seven days why each prisoner still denied home
confinement or compassionate release could not be sent to a different
prison where social distancing was achievable.71
The next day, the prison officials sought a stay of the original
preliminary injunction from the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme
Court denied that request on May 26, 2020, but its brief statement noted
that the officials were “seeking a stay only of the District Court’s April
22 preliminary injunction” and had not yet “sought review of or a stay of
the May 19 order” in the Sixth Circuit.72 “Particularly in light of that
procedural posture,” the Court wrote, the request was denied “without
prejudice to the Government seeking a new stay if circumstances
warrant.”73 Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch would
have granted the stay outright.74
The prison officials soon filed renewed stay motions in the district
court and the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit issued a denial on June 1,

64. Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-3447, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 14291 (6th Cir. May 4, 2020); see
Wilson, 961 F.3d at 836.
65. See Wilson, 961 F.3d at 836; see also Mot. to Enforce, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794
(N.D. Ohio May 6, 2020), D.E. 51; Order Granting Motion to Enforce, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv00794 (N.D. Ohio May 19, 2020), D.E. 85.
66. Order Granting Motion to Enforce at 2, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D. Ohio
May 19, 2020), D.E. No. 85.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7–8.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Denial of Appl. for Stay, Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1041 (May 26, 2020).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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2020,75 and the district court followed suit on June 4, 2020.76 On June 1,
2020, however, the prison officials also filed a renewed stay application
with the U.S. Supreme Court.77
Justice Sotomayor issued an
administrative stay on June 4, 2020, pending resolution of the appeal of
the preliminary injunction, which was scheduled for oral argument the
following day.78
On June 9, 2020, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s
preliminary injunction.79 Writing for the panel’s majority,80 Judge
Gibbons first concluded that the district court properly exercised
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 2241 because the prisoners were asserting
“that there are no conditions of confinement sufficient to prevent
irreparable constitutional injury at Elkton” and therefore were seeking
“release.”81 Judge Gibbons added, however, that habeas also limited what
types of relief were available. While declining “to set forth a
comprehensive list,” Judge Gibbons concluded that a transfer order would
not be authorized under § 2241.82
Judge Gibbons then turned to the preliminary-injunction factors and,
specifically, to the prisoners’ likelihood of success on their Eighth
Amendment claim. While concluding that the objective component of the
deliberate-indifference analysis was “easily satisfied,”83 Judge Gibbons
concluded that the prisoners were unlikely to prevail on the subjective
component “because, as of April 22, the BOP responded reasonably to the
known, serious risks posed by COVID-19.”84 Judge Gibbons noted, for
example, that the BOP “implemented a six-phase action plan to reduce
the risk of COVID-19 spread at Elkton, . . . including screening for
symptoms, educating staff and inmates about COVID-19, cancelling
visitation, quarantining new inmates, implementing regular cleaning,
providing disinfectant supplies, and providing masks.”85 Her majority
opinion concluded that the prisoners had failed to show a likelihood of
success on the merits and that this failure was “dispositive.”86
75. Order Denying Motion for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-3447 (6th Cir. June 1, 2020),
Doc. No. 46-2.
76. Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-00794 (N.D.
Ohio June 4, 2020), D.E. 109.
77. Appl. for Stay, Wilson, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (No. 19A1047) (June 1, 2020).
78. Id.; Order on Appl. for Stay, Wilson v. Williams, No. 19A1047 (June 4, 2020).
79. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 845 (6th Cir. 2020).
80. Judge Gibbons was joined by Judge Cook. Id. at 832. Chief Judge Cole issued a separate
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id.
81. Id. at 838.
82. Id. at 838–39.
83. Id. at 840.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 841.
86. Id. at 844.
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Chief Judge Cole concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that
jurisdiction was proper under § 2241 but disagreeing that transfer was an
inappropriate form of relief.87 Chief Judge Cole also disagreed that the
prisoners were unable to demonstrate deliberate indifference,88 likening
the situation to a prior Sixth Circuit case in which prison officials had
been deemed “deliberately indifferent when they persisted in treating an
inmate’s medical condition with medication that was known to be
ineffective instead of an alternative that had proven to be much more
effective in addressing the condition.”89 This “failure” was “more
jarring” given that Congress and the Attorney General had both gone “out
of their way to urge the BOP to take more aggressive measures to address
the virus in its facilities.”90
Chief Judge Cole also stated that while the phrase “‘multiphase action
plan’ . . . sounds good on paper,” a “look behind the curtain . . . reveal[ed]
that the BOP’s six-phase action plan” was “far less impressive than its
title suggest[ed].”91 Ultimately, he observed, “the ‘six-phase’ plan is, for
practical purposes, a four-phase plan where one phase is taking inventory
of supplies and another involves the locking of inmates in 150-person
clusters where they cannot access the principal method of COVID-19
prevention.”92
2. The Illinois State Prisons
The boldest COVID-19 case likely involved Illinois state prisons. It
was really two cases—Money v. Pritzker93 and Money v. Jeffreys94—
though the district court resolved them together,95 so I therefore discuss
them as one. There, ten Illinois prisoners scattered across the State’s
correctional facilities brought putative class actions raising both civilrights claims under § 1983 and habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
federal court, all based primarily (and as relevant here) on the Eighth
Amendment as made enforceable against the States by the Fourteenth.96
The prisoners sought immediate injunctive relief, including—at least
ultimately—transfer or release, and asked the district court to certify six
separate subclasses based on medical risk factors and eligibility for
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 846 (Cole, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 846–47.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
Id.
20-cv-2093 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
20-cv-2094 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
See Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
Id. at 1112.
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certain forms of relief.97 The first two subclasses alone contained nearly
16,000 people.98
The case did not last long in its prominent phase: filed on April 2,
2020,99 it yielded one of the first big federal COVID-19 opinions on April
10, 2020, when Judge Robert Dow, Jr., issued an opinion and order
denying the preliminary relief that the prisoners sought.100 Judge Dow
began by considering the riddle of whether a suit could seek relief under
both § 1983 and the habeas statute.101 He observed that while habeas
petitioners generally seek “release from custody,” the petitioners in this
case had conceded that they were not seeking release from custody and
were challenging “only the conditions of their confinement.”102 While
noting a “thick and tangled web” of statutes and case law, Judge Dow
ultimately concluded that the prisoners could go forward with their § 1983
claims, and that it was “at least plausible—though far less certain—that
they also ha[d] a right to seek habeas relief as well.”103
Regarding the § 1983 claims, Judge Dow turned to the PLRA.
Reflecting on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata104 (which
was “the only instance” in which a federal court had ordered thousands of
state prisoners released, and then only after a complex, 12-year
process105), as well as subsequent litigation over COVID-19 in the
ongoing Plata litigation and the nature of the relief sought by the Money
prisoners, Judge Dow ultimately concluded that what they sought
amounted to a “prisoner release order” subject to the PLRA’s
requirements.106 “Reducing the prison population is not just a side effect
of the case—it is the whole point,” Judge Dow reasoned. “They want to
remove inmates from prison because they are vulnerable in those
facilities.”107
Even if the PLRA did not apply, Judge Dow noted, other problems
existed. For one, Judge Dow doubted that class-wide relief was
permissible. While there were ample common questions, it was unclear
that any of them was “likely to drive the resolution of the case.”108 Rather,
97. Id. at 1115–16; see also id. at 1120.
98. Id. at 1116.
99. See Compl., Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2020) (No. 20-cv-2093), D.E. 1.
100. Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1137.
101. Id. at 1117–19.
102. Id. at 1118.
103. Id. at 1119.
104. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
105. Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1122.
106. Id. at 1126.
107. Id. at 1125.
108. Id. at 1127. To certify a class action there must be “questions of law or fact common to the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Commonality requires at least one question common to all of the class
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Judge Dow reasoned that the need for “individualized determinations”
made the case a poor candidate for class adjudication.109 The
“permutations,” he concluded, were “endless.”110
Judge Dow also noted “serious concerns under core principles of
federalism and the separation of powers, especially given [the prisoners’]
request for sweeping relief in the form of a mandatory injunction.”111
Observing that “the federal judiciary only rarely intrudes into the
management of state prisons, and only once in history has actually
ordered the release of prisoners on a scale anywhere near what Plaintiffs
hope to accomplish through this litigation,”112 Judge Dow cautioned that
while Plata indicated that relief was appropriate at least under some
circumstances, the pace of the case cautioned against interceding.113
Finally, Judge Dow concluded that the prisoners’ claims failed for
lacking a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.114 While agreeing
immediately that COVID-19 posed a serious risk to the prisoners, Judge
Dow concluded that under the deliberate-indifference standard, the
prisoners had “no chance of success” because the defendants had “come
forward with a lengthy list of the actions they ha[d] taken to protect”
Illinois prisoners.115 The defendants, Judge Dow wrote, were clearly
“trying, very hard, to protect inmates against the virus,” and there was no
support in the record for the assertion that they had “turned the kind of
blind eye and deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate ‘total
unconcern’ for the inmates’ welfare.”116
Finally, Judge Dow dispatched the prisoners’ habeas claims, noting
that the federal habeas statutes impose exhaustion requirements on state
prisoners who wish to seek habeas relief from federal courts.117 Judge
Dow noted that it was “undisputed” that the prisoners had not done so,118
and he concluded that there were no grounds for waiving the requirement
because the prisoners had not shown that the state court system was
unavailable.119
members, the answer to which is “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d.
at 1127 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
109. Id. at 1128.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1128–29.
112. Id. at 1129.
113. Id. at 1129–30.
114. Id. at 1130–33.
115. Id. at 1131.
116. Id. at 1132 (citation omitted). I return below to whether this and other applications of the
deliberate-indifference standard were consistent with Eighth Amendment doctrine as explained by the
Supreme Court.
117. Id. at 1134; see also 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)–(c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
118. Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
119. Id. at 1136.
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3. FCI Danbury
One of the only fully successful cases, Martinez-Brooks v. Easter120
arose out of the COVID-19 outbreak at FCI Danbury, a low-security
federal facility in Connecticut.121 Like Elkton, Danbury was one of the
three federal prisons singled out by Attorney General Barr in his April 3,
2020 memo exhorting BOP to “maximize” the use of home confinement
in response to the outbreaks.122 On April 27, 2020, four medically
vulnerable prisoners at Danbury brought the case as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus under § 2241 and requested an “emergency order of
enlargement.”123
On May 12, 2020, Judge Michael Shea granted a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”). Regarding jurisdiction, Judge Shea emphasized that he
was “not modify[ing] any sentences,” but rather ensuring that medically
vulnerable prisoners would “receive prompt review of either a request for
compassionate release or consideration for home confinement” under
BOP’s existing statutory authority.124 He stated that the prisoners were
not seeking “release” from BOP custody but that, in any event, Second
Circuit precedent allowed bail for habeas petitioners in “extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances” in which bail is “necessary to make the
habeas remedy effective.”125 Citing two of the Elkton decisions to date,
Judge Shea also found the PLRA inapplicable, observing that because the
prisoners were claiming that their confinement at Danbury itself violated
the Eighth Amendment and thus were seeking an order ending that
confinement, they were engaged in a “habeas proceeding challenging ‘the
fact . . . of confinement in prison.’”126 He also rejected BOP’s invocation
of the Second Circuit’s exhaustion doctrine, concluding that “[g]iven the
rapid spread of COVID-19 at FCI Danbury,” the prisoners had “shown
that they would likely suffer irreparable harm if they were required to
exhaust the administrative remedy process.”127
On the merits of the TRO, Judge Shea concluded that the prisoners
120. 459 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D. Conn. 2020).
121. Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 415 (D. Conn. 2020).
122. See id. at 414–15; see also Barr Memo, supra note 45.
123. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Martinez-Brooks, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411 (No. 3:20-cv00569) (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2020), D.E. 1; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text; infra Section
III.E.
124. Martinez-Brooks, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 430.
125. Id. at 431 (quoting Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
126. Id. at 434 (“Because Petitioners contend that the Eighth Amendment violation inheres in their
incarceration at Danbury FCI and cannot be remedied unless they are removed from that setting,
Petitioners are challenging the fact—or ‘existence’—of their confinement.” (citing Wilson v. Williams,
455 F.Supp.3d 467, 474–75, 480–81 (N.D. Ohio 2020); Order at 6, D.E. 23-1, Wilson v. Williams, No.
20-3447 (6th Cir. May 4, 2020))).
127. Id. at 437–38.
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were likely to succeed in establishing an Eighth Amendment violation
because, in addition to the substantial risk posed by COVID-19 at
Danbury, they had shown subjective indifference in the Warden’s
lackluster efforts “to transfer medically vulnerable prisoners . . . to home
confinement” and poor handling of requests for compassionate release
under § 3582(c)(1)(A).128 As Judge Shea summarized, despite the
CARES Act’s specific authorization for home confinement and the
Attorney General’s “exhortations,” FCI Danbury’s “implementation of
this directive . . . ha[d] been slow and inflexible.”129 For example, the
Respondents had been ignoring health risks in their home-confinement
evaluations, instead “focusing on those who have served the larger
portions of their sentences” and even “categorically disqualif[ying]” those
who had not served at least half of their sentences.130 While the
Government had suggested “compassionate release as an alternative,”
that was clearly “a dead end”: while there had been 241 compassionaterelease applications filed since the pandemic began, the Warden had
granted “exactly 0.”131
While noting the intramural measures that the Warden had claimed to
have implemented, Judge Shea observed that the Warden did “not dispute
the impossibility of instituting effective social distancing measures in
facilities, like FCI Danbury, where the vast majority of the population
lives and sleeps in large dormitory halls lined with bunk beds, sharing
bathroom and shower facilities.”132 Because “containment” was
impossible without effective social distancing, home confinement was
“the only viable measure by which the safety of highly vulnerable
inmates” could be “reasonably assured.”133 Given the crisis, “the
Warden’s failure to make prompter, broader use of [home confinement]
authority to protect the lives of vulnerable inmates [wa]s likely to
constitute deliberate indifference.”134 And the Warden’s failure to grant
a single compassionate-release request, whether because she was setting
“an impossible high bar” or simply “applying an obsolete one,” along
with the languorous pace at which Danbury was processing such requests,
further supported the same conclusion.135
The order did not, however, require the release of any particular
128. Id. at 440–41.
129. Id. at 441.
130. Id. Similarly, “any inmate with an incident report in the past 12 months—no matter the
seriousness—[wa]s deemed ineligible for home confinement, regardless of any health condition he or she
might have.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 443; see id. at 442.
133. Id. at 443.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 445; see id. at 446.
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prisoner; this “determination,” Judge Shea wrote, “must be
individualized.”136 Judge Shea concluded, however, that “multi-party
treatment” was “likely appropriate,” given that the relief being granted
was applicable to the entire medically vulnerable subclass, multi-party
treatment was consistent with judicial economy, and each of the Rule
23(a) requirements weighed in favor of multi-party treatment as well.137
Judge Shea’s TRO required the Warden to take several steps in short
order. First, she had to publicly identify all medically vulnerable
prisoners within three days.138 Second, within the same time period, she
had to “[f]inalize and implement a process that makes full and speedy use
of” her home-confinement authority while “prioritizing” vulnerable
prisoners and “assigning substantial weight” to COVID-19 risk factors,
along with eliminating any factors that could lead to mandatory denials
regardless of risk factors.139 Third, within seven days, she had to act on
all pending compassionate-release requests from medically vulnerable
prisoners, implement a process to ensure that future applicants would
receive responses within the same time frame, and either update the
relevant compassionate-release guidelines to account for COVID-19 or
show cause as to why she should not have to do so.140 In addition, within
13 days, she had to complete a home-confinement review and provide
individual explanations for each denial of home confinement or
transfer.141
In this case, the prison officials did not appeal, and the parties over the
summer negotiated a settlement that would allow for expanded use of
home confinement “pursuant to the standards set forth in” the May 12,
2020 order.142 Specifically, the parties agreed that the prison officials
would set up a process for reviewing each medically vulnerable Danbury
prisoner for home confinement, assigning “substantial weight” to
COVID-19 risk factors and including a “medical clinician” in the process,
along with transparency about the process and written explanations for
any denials.143

136. Id. at 447. Judge Shea declined to require new safety measures, stating that factual disputes
about what measures had already been implemented precluded him from concluding that the prisoners
were likely to succeed on that part of their claim. Id. at 449.
137. Id. at 451; see id. at 452.
138. Id. at 454.
139. Id. at 455.
140. Id. at 455–56.
141. Id. at 456.
142. Mem. of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Motion to Certify Settlement Class and for
Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel at 6, D.E. 134, Whitted v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv00569 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2020). The case’s name changed after Dianthe Martinez-Brooks and other
named petitioners were released. See id. at 2 n.1.
143. Id.
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4. FCI/USP Lompoc
The other bright spot among the federal COVID-19 habeas cases,
Torres v. Milusnic,144 followed a similar path to the Danbury litigation.
Lompoc,145 another federal facility—about an hour northwest of Santa
Barbara, California, featuring both a minimum-, low-, and mediumsecurity facility—had a 60% infection rate when five prisoners brought
this putative class action on May 16, 2020, seeking relief under § 2241 or
alternatively under § 1331 for asserted Eighth Amendment violations.146
On July 14, 2020, Judge Consuelo Marshall granted a preliminary
injunction and provisionally certified a medically vulnerable class of
prisoners over age 50 or with certain health conditions, ordering the
Warden and BOP to evaluate all relevant prisoners for home confinement;
to give “substantial weight to the inmate’s risk factors”; to update their
compassionate-relief criteria to account for COVID-19; and to
recommend approval or deny all compassionate-release applications
before them.147
On the jurisdictional question, the court cited decisions from the Elkton
and Danbury litigation, among others, to conclude that habeas jurisdiction
under § 2241 was proper. “Because Petitioners contend there are no set
of conditions of confinement that could be constitutional,” Judge
Marshall wrote, “the Court finds Petitioners challenge the fact of their
confinement.”148
On the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim, the court found that the
officials’ lackadaisical approach to home confinement and compassionate
release created a likelihood of success on the merits. 149 Judge Marshall
observed, for example, that despite the CARES Act and the Attorney
General’s exhortations, “[a]s of April 20, 2020, only 59 Lompoc inmates
had been considered for home confinement and 24 inmates were
scheduled to be released to home confinement or a Residential Reentry
144. 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
145. Because, like Elkton, the facility technically includes both FCI and USP Lompoc, see Torres
v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (C.D. Cal. 2020), I use “Lompoc” collectively.
146. Complaint and Petition at 42–46, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. CV 204450), D.E. 1.
147. Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 746– 47. The court denied the prisoners’ request for a TRO
requiring prison officials “to implement . . . specific safety measures” in light of “disputed facts.” Id. at
734
148. Id. at 726. The court rejected the prison officials’ PLRA argument, citing the Elkton case, in
light of the fact that the prisoners were properly “challenging the fact of their confinement” under § 2241.
See id. at 742. The court also concluded that administrative exhaustion was excused because these
remedies were “not available,” in light of prisoners having been “instructed by prison officials not to
submit grievances and requests for compassionate release because such grievances and requests were not
being accepted due to understaffing” and at least one petitioner showing that his compassionate-release
request had not received a response. Id. at 743.
149. See id. at 740.
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Center,”150 along with other evidence that the officials had “ignored . . .
the known urgency to consider inmates for home confinement,
particularly those most vulnerable.”151 In addition, there was “no
evidence demonstrating consideration of Lompoc inmates’ risk factors . .
. in evaluating requests for compassionate release, and Petitioners’
evidence suggest[ed] requests for compassionate release [we]re
discouraged/not being accepted at Lompoc.”152 In sum, Judge Marshall
concluded that the prisoners were likely to succeed on their Eighth
Amendment claims given both the officials’ failures to use their powers
more aggressively or demonstrate that they were taking COVID-19 risk
into account.153
As with the Elkton litigation, compliance with the terms of the district
court’s order was contested. On September 10, 2020, the prisoners moved
for enforcement of the preliminary injunction,154 and on October 8, 2020,
Judge Marshall granted the motion, concluding that the prison officials
were “not making full and speedy use of their CARES Act authority in
violation of the preliminary injunction.”155 The court ordered the Warden
and BOP to confirm that all class members previously identified as
approved for home confinement had actually been released and to explain
any delays for prisoners who had not yet been released.156 The court also
offered the officials to identify any prisoners who were denied home
confinement and instead sent to a halfway house despite having “no
history of violence, no sex-offense- or terrorism-related convictions” and
lacking a high PATTERN score, as well as any prisoners denied home
confinement in lieu of a halfway house despite having “a viable release
plan.”157
*

*

*

Reading through the past four cases, one might think that the prisoners
more or less batted .500. In fact, the results were far more
disappointing.158 As Professor Sharon Dolovich summarizes:
150. Id. at 736.
151. Id. at 738 (citing the Elkton and Danbury cases).
152. Id. at 738–39.
153. Id. at 740. Judge Marshall also concluded that the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites, as well as
Rule 23(b)(2), were satisfied for purposes of a provisional class certification. See id. at 743–46.
154. Notice of Motion and Motion to Enforce Compliance, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal.
2020) (No. CV 20-4450), D.E. 93.
155. Order Granting Motion to Enforce Compliance at 3–4, Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal.
2020) (No. CV 20-4450), D.E. 105.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id. at 5–6.
158. For other examples of defeats, see, for example, Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476 (D.N.J.
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[T]o date, of the innumerable class actions that have been brought by
incarcerated plaintiffs since March, only two—Martinez-Brooks v. Easter
and Torres v. Milusnic—have yielded releases. Each involved a single
federal facility . . . [a]nd in each case, the number of people released has
thus far been relatively small, 119 from Danbury and 165 from Lompoc.159

Indeed, it seems likely that, as Dolovich observes, “by the third week of
May, by which time a number of appellate decisions had already been
entered and the first Supreme Court order issued in Wilson [the Elkton
case], corrections officials would have seen enough to know which way
the wind was blowing.”160 The Danbury and Lompoc cases built on the
Elkton cases, and they unfolded in appellate jurisdictions (the Second and
Ninth Circuits) where the BOP may well have judged its prospects worse
than it did in the Sixth Circuit.
B. Jail Cases
Given their status as “mostly temporary waystations,” jails offered both
higher promise and higher peril when it came to criminal defendants
facing involuntary exposure to COVID-19.161 On the optimistic side,
because median stays are shorter, often subject (for pretrial detainees) to
the discretion of judges with regard to bail, and the offenses (or alleged
offenses) involved are comparatively more likely to be minor, judges (and
sometimes sheriffs) can more easily “take steps to shrink jail populations”
both by restricting the pipeline of new detainees and by revisiting some
detention decisions (for example, revisiting bail) with “relatively little
political risk of the sort that has largely thwarted meaningful
decarceration efforts since the ‘tough on crime’ era began.”162 Efforts
across the country “had a notable effect”: “[b]y mid-May 2020, the
median national jail population had dropped by 31 percent from the start
of the pandemic.”163 Unfortunately, this trend did not last, and the
numbers soon “began to creep back up,” with “at least 50 percent of the
reductions” having been “erased by new admissions” as of October 1.164
But there are dispiriting features, too. First, transparency is especially
limited: while prisons are no paragons on transparency, it has been
comparatively easier to track the COVID-19 crisis unfolding there.165
2020) (Fort Dix); Livas v. Myers, 455 F. Supp. 3d 272 (W.D. La. 2020) (FCI Oakdale).
159. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 24 n.46.
160. Id. at 24.
161. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 15.
162. Id. at 15–16.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id.
165. See UCLA LAW, COVID-19 BEHIND BARS DATA PROJECT, https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/
(lasted visited Oct. 22, 2021); A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT,
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While “the biggest jail systems now publish their data on dashboards of
the sort found on DOC websites, most jails around the country post no
data at all.”166 Second, because average prison stays are much longer than
average jail stays,167 we should expect people incarcerated in jails to face
even greater danger from COVID-19 exposure (given the churn).
Nevertheless, they may be less likely to secure counsel to bring a legal
challenge, both because they may be less likely to reach out (whether
because they have a higher likelihood of imminent release or because they
are focused on a pending prosecution) and because they are concomitantly
easier to moot out or otherwise pick off as plaintiffs. Third, while prisons
are generally run by the state or federal government, jails are often
managed by cash-strapped counties and other local municipalities.168
For all these reasons (and likely more), criminal defendants generally
think of jail conditions as even worse than prison conditions, making it
no surprise that the COVID-19 situation in jails was always likely to be
bleak. Two big federal habeas cases involving jails—Cameron v.
Bouchard, which involved Michigan’s Oakland County Jail, and Barnes
v. Ahlman, which involved the Orange County Jail—show a pattern of
trial-court success followed by appellate court reversal.
1. The Oakland County Jail
The Oakland County Jail, in Michigan, houses over 1,600 detainees
across three main housing units, some of which are dormitory-style and
others of which are celled.169 “In some housing areas, inmates sleep a
foot apart or less and, in others, inmates may have to sleep side-by-side
in the middle of the floor. . . All inmates, no matter where they are
housed, share showers, toilets, sinks, brooms, and cleaning supplies.”170
Detainees at the Oakland County Jail brought this case on April 17,
2020, as another combination putative civil-rights class action under §
1983 and representative habeas petition under § 2241.171 That same day,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2021).
166. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 28.
167. “The average jail term is less than 30 days.” Id. at 15 n.25. The average prison term, on the
other hand, is roughly two and a half years. See Danielle Kaeble, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME SERVED
IN STATE PRISON, 2016 (Nov. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf (average time
served of 2.6 years for U.S. prisoners released in 2016).
168. See Lauren-Brook Eisen, Criminal Justice Reform at the State Level, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/criminal-justicereform-state-level.
169. Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 755–56 (E.D. Mich. 2020), vacated, Cameron v.
Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).
170. Id. at 756.
171. Id. at 753.
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Judge Linda Parker issued a TRO directing the jail officials to improve
sanitation and health safety at the jail and ordered them to disclose the
names of all medically vulnerable detainees.172 On May 21, 2020, Judge
Parker granted a preliminary injunction, requiring the jail officials to take
further steps to slow the spread of the virus internally and to provide
information “to enable the Court to implement a system for considering
the release on bond or other alternatives to detention in the Jail for each
subclass member.”173 Judge Parker wrote that “[i]n extraordinary cases
like this, federal judges have the authority to release detainees on bail
while their habeas petitions are pending.”174
On May 26, 2020, the Sixth Circuit denied a stay,175 and on May 31,
the district court “began the process for granting bail for members of the
medically vulnerable subclass.”176 In the meantime, the Elkton litigation
was unfolding while the Supreme Court had denied the first stay
application on May 26, 2020.177 Justice Sotomayor had entered an
administrative stay on June 4, 2020.178 On June 5, 2020, the Cameron
Defendants renewed their motion for a stay with the Sixth Circuit
“arguing that intervening changes in the law warranted a reconsideration
of our initial denial of their motion.”179 On June 9, a majority of the
Wilson panel vacated the Elkton preliminary injunction,180 and on June
11, a majority of the Cameron panel granted the Cameron defendants’
renewed stay motion.181 On July 9, largely following the rationale of the
Elkton decision, the Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction in
Cameron as well.182
Chief Judge Cole, who had also been on the Wilson panel, dissented.
While questioning the majority’s use of Wilson—a prison case—as
binding precedent for cases involving pretrial detainees,183 Chief Judge
172. Id. at 753.
173. Order at 6, Cameron, No. 2:20-cv-10949 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2020), D.E. 94.
174. Id. at 7 (citing Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d
77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990); Savino v. Souza, 453 F.Supp.3d 441, 452–54 (D. Mass. 2020)).
175. Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 20-1469, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741 (6th Cir. May 26, 2020).
176. Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2020).
177. Order Denying Appl. for Stay, Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1041 (May 26, 2020).
178. Williams v. Wilson, No. 19A1047, 2020 WL 2988458 (Mem) (June 4, 2020).
179. Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 983.
180. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
181. Cameron v. Bouchard, 818 Fed. App’x 393 (6th Cir. June 11, 2020). Chief Judge Cole
dissented.
182. Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 983; see, e.g., id. at 985 (calling steps taken by Defendants “very
similar to the steps taken by the officials in Wilson”); id. at 988 (“Given our decision in Wilson, a case
that is binding on us, we agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of
their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.”).
183. Id. at 989 (Cole, C.J., dissenting). Both the majority and the dissent avoided the lurking issue
regarding whether the same deliberate-indifference test that applies under the Eighth Amendment should
apply to legally innocent, pretrial detainees (whose claims are subject to Fourteenth Amendment due

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1

26

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

Cole further averred that Wilson did “not stretch so far as to foreclose a
constitutional claim based on the record” in Cameron,184 detailing
evidence suggesting that the Defendants were “more interested . . . in
convincing courts” that they were acting responsibly rather than actually
“keeping the inmates in their care safe.”185 For example, he noted
seemingly retaliatory transfers of detainees who sought to raise concerns
and grievances, as well as changes in posted times that were suspiciously
timed to an inspection of the jail.186 He also noted credibility
determinations made by Judge Parker as well as the Jail’s seemingly
“irrational allocation of resources,” such as keeping “some cells empty
while leaving other inmates in multi-person cells”187 and seemingly
inadequate quarantine procedures, which seemed to have exposed
possibly infectious detainees to previously uninfected ones.188
2. The Orange County Jail
Another combination habeas–civil rights case, Ahlman v. Barnes, was
filed on April 30, 2020.189 As of the prior day, “117 people in the Orange
County Jail ha[d] tested positive for COVID-19 out of 227 people who
were tested.”190 At that time, “there were nearly 3,000 inmates still in the
Jail’s care, 488 of whom were medically vulnerable to COVID-19.”191
On May 26, 2020, Judge Jesus Bernal granted partial immediate relief
for the detainees, ordering that the Jail undertake fourteen steps to
mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while denying a request for detainee
releases on the ground that it was not clearly necessary (and therefore not
further addressing the applicability of habeas relief).192 Judge Bernal
noted that while the officials had “reduced the Jail’s population,” they had
process), cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), by concluding that the result was the same
“under the more-stringent Eighth Amendment review that all parties agree[d] applies to the claims of the
convicted inmates at the jail.” Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 989 (Cole, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 984–85
(majority opinion).
184. Id. at 991 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 991–92.
187. Id. at 993.
188. Id. at 993–94.
189. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Compl., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, (C.D.
Cal. 2020) (No. 20-cv-835), ECF No. 1.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2624 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of
stay).
192. Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 693–95, 695 n.18 (C.D. Cal. 2020). “Because it is
plausible that the Jail could mitigate many of the risks presented by COVID-19 with better compliance
with the CDC Guidelines,” Judge Bernal reasoned, “Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate
that the need for release outweighs the risks of releasing of 488 inmates without individualized
assessments.” Id. at 693.
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“failed to meet the 50% target reduction rate set by” their own health
service,193 had instituted only a partial quarantine and inadequate social
distancing,194 and engaged in questionable testing practices, including
allowing detainees “awaiting the outcome of a COVID-19 test . . . to
return to the general population.”195 He concluded that their compliance
with CDC guidelines had “been piecemeal and inadequate,” noting that it
was “belied by the fact that there [were by then] 369 confirmed COVID19 cases in the Jail—up from only 26 confirmed cases less than a month”
before.196
Judge Bernal also suggested that “the CDC Guidelines represent the
floor, not the ceiling, of an adequate response” at a facility with so many
cases.197 “As the rate of infection rises,” he wrote, “so must the required
response.”198 Judge Bernal described the need for a sliding scale: “one
bar of soap a week may not be deliberately indifferent where there are no
infections but it certainly is where—as here—there are hundreds of
infected individuals with new cases daily.”199
On June 12, 2020, the Ninth Circuit denied a stay of the preliminary
injunction while issuing a limited remand for the district court to consider
whether “changed circumstances . . . might merit modification or
dissolution of the preliminary injunction.”200 On June 26, 2020, the
district court denied the Defendants’ application to dissolve the
injunction,201 and on June 29, the Ninth Circuit denied a further stay

193. Id. at 680.
194. Id. at 681.
195. Id. at 682.
196. Id. at 688-89. Judge Bernal observed that this meant that “[a]n individual incarcerated at the
Jail [wa]s nearly one hundred times more likely to get COVID-19 than the average resident of Orange
County.” Id.
197. Id. at 691.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18677, at *2 (9th Cir. June 12,
2020). The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on June 17, 2020, expanding on the June 12 order. See
Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20801, at *2 & n.1 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020).
The court of appeals largely relied on the District Court’s factual findings, subject to clear-error review,
noting that “[o]n those facts, which portrayed a response that fell well short of the CDC guidelines and
resulted in an explosion of COVID-19 cases in the jail.” Id. at *9. The court also noted that the jail
officials’ arguments on appeal were “diametrically opposed to their litigation position in the district
court,” where they had claimed that they had “already implemented” the “measures requested by Plaintiffs
(and later incorporated into the injunction),” a paradox that doomed their irreparable-injury claims. Id. at
*7–8. Judge Ryan Nelson concurred in part and dissented in part, asserting that the majority was
“adopt[ing] an unprecedented interpretation” of the Constitution by allowing the district court to order the
jail to go beyond the CDC’s Interim Guidance. Id. at *12–13.
201. Order (1) Denying Defs. Ex Parte Appl. to Dissolve Inj.; (2) Granting Pls.’ Mot. For Expedited
Disc.; (3) Den. Pls.’ Appl. To Shorten Time; and (4) Vacating the July 20, 2020 Hearing, Ahlman, v.
Barnes, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223677 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (No. 20-cv-835), No. 93.
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application.202
On August 5, 2020, by a 5–4 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
a stay of the preliminary injunction.203 Justices Breyer and Kagan noted
their dissents, and Justice Sotomayor issued an opinion, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, dissenting from the grant of the stay. In her dissent, Justice
Sotomayor noted that while the Jail had “voluntarily released 53 percent”
of its detainees and “claim[ed] that it had largely implemented the CDC
Guidelines and radically increased hygiene and cleaning within its walls,
the District Court, whose factual findings are owed deference, found the
reality to be very different.”204 And as she noted in response to the Jail’s
claim that the preliminary injunction went beyond CDC Guidelines, the
Jail had cited “just two alleged discrepancies: first, that the District Court
ordered the Jail to provide adequate spacing of six feet or more between
incarcerated people, whereas the CDC Guidelines suggest only that six
feet of space is ‘ideal[]’; and second, that the injunction requires daily
temperature checks and screening questions.”205
C. Non-Habeas Cases
Not all federal COVID-19 cases sought release; some plaintiffs brought
standard civil-rights claims seeking intramural improvements in prison
conditions instead or as well. Some of these cases nevertheless generated
significant rulings (generally negative for prisoners) regarding the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment in the context of COVID-19, thereby
impacting cases proceeding under the habeas theory. Below, I discuss
two such cases: one involving a Texas geriatric prison, and one involving
a Miami-Dade County jail.
1. Texas’s “Pack Unit”
The Valentine v. Collier litigation concerned the “Pack Unit,” “a
geriatric prison in southeast Texas that has been ravaged by COVID19.”206 This § 1983 putative class action was filed on March 30, 2020,
raising Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 claims.207
202. Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20300 (9th Cir. June 29, 2020).
203. Barnes, 140 S.Ct. at 2620.
204. Id. at 2622 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay).
205. Id. at 2623 (alteration in original).
206. Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 57 (Nov. 16, 2020) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from
denial of application to vacate stay).
207. Compl. and Application at 28-31, Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
(No. 20-cv-1115), ECF No. 1. Many other COVID-19 cases also raised ADA claims. See, e.g., Garrett
& Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 19, 32. Those claims are important, but outside the scope of this Article.
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On April 16, 2020, Judge Keith Ellison entered a preliminary
injunction, requiring officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ) to take a number of steps to reduce the spread of COVID-19
within the Pack Unit.208 In a memorandum opinion filed a few days later,
Judge Ellison noted that the prison had “refused to give inmates alcoholbased hand sanitizer or disposable paper towels,”209 had insufficiently
communicated information on how to protect against transmission of
COVID-19,210 had engaged in very limited testing (64 prisoners out of
1,248 at the time of the injunction),211 and was unable to provide for
adequate social distancing.212 He concluded that exhaustion should be
excused “[i]n light of the alarming speed” of COVID-19213 and the
prison’s “lengthy administrative procedure, which TDCJ may choose to
extend at will.”214
On the Eighth Amendment question, Judge Ellison found that the
TDCJ actions fell “short of their own policy” and did “not reasonably
abate the extremely high risk facing the inmates in Pack Unit.”215 To the
extent his order demanded something more than TDCJ and CDC policies
required, Judge Ellison explained, it did so “with great care and out of
great necessity.”216
On April 22, 2020, in a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit stayed the
preliminary injunction.217 The majority of the panel concluded that the
prison officials were likely to prevail for two reasons relating to the
Eighth Amendment question.218 First, while the COVID-19 risk was real,
the panel stated that the district court had “acknowledged that the ‘extra
measures’ it required ‘go[] beyond TDCJ and CDC policies,’” whereas
the prisoners had “cited no precedent holding that the CDC’s
recommendations are insufficient.”219 Second, the prisoners had shown
insufficient evidence of TDCJ’s subjective deliberate indifference to
208. Preliminary Injunction Order, Valentine, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 20-cv1115), ECF No. 40.
209. Memorandum and Order at 10, Valentine, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 20-cv1115), ECF No. 51.
210. Id. at 11–12.
211. See id. at 7, 12.
212. Id. at 12–13.
213. Id. at 16.
214. Id. at 17.
215. Id. at 21.
216. Id. at 25.
217. Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 2020). Judge Higginson concurred in the
judgment.
218. Id. at 801.
219. Id. at 802. In addition, the panel noted, the District Court could not enjoin the State “to follow
its own laws and procedures.” Id. at 802; see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89 (1984).
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satisfy the test for an Eighth Amendment claim.220 On the other stay
factors, the court likewise sided with TDCJ, concluding that the order
“created ‘an administrative nightmare’ for TDCJ” and that this “harm”
was “particularly acute because the district court’s order interferes with
the rapidly changing and flexible system-wide approach that TDCJ has
used to respond to the pandemic so far.”221 Nor, the court reasoned, had
the prisoners demonstrated that they would “suffer irreparable injuries
even after accounting for the protective measures” that TDCJ was
taking.222 The majority added that the prisoners “appear[ed]” to face
PLRA problems both in terms of a failure to exhaust available remedies
and the breadth of the district court’s order.223
On May 14, 2020, the Supreme Court denied an application to vacate
the stay,224 and on June 5, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction.225 On September 29, 2020, following an eighteen-day trial,
Judge Ellison entered a permanent injunction, requiring TDCJ to
undertake a list of 17 obligations similar to those in the preliminary
injunction.226
On October 13, 2020, a new panel of the Fifth Circuit stayed the
permanent injunction.227 While acknowledging that the grievance process
was “[b]y all accounts . . . suboptimal,” the court concluded, first, that
the procedure was nevertheless “available,” and thus that the prisoners
were required to exhaust.228
Because there was no “‘special
circumstances’ exception” in the PLRA, the panel reasoned, “even threats
posed by global pandemics” did “not matter.”229
220. Valentine, 956 F.3d at 802.
221. Id. at 803; see id. at 804.
222. Id. at 804.
223. See id. at 805–06. Judge Higginson based his concurrence in the judgment on the exhaustion
point, noting that the court’s opinion did “not foreclose the possibility that, upon expedited consideration,
our court may nonetheless conclude that a remedy using the [TDCJ] grievance system is not ‘available’
because of the immediacy of the COVID-19 medical emergency coupled with statements credited by the
district court that prisoners’ grievances may not be addressed promptly.” Id. at 806 (Higginson, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
224. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598 (2020). Justice Sotomayor filed a statement respecting
the denial, joined by Justice Ginsburg, “to highlight the disturbing allegations presented below” and to
note that “where plaintiffs demonstrate that a prison grievance system cannot or will not respond to an
inmate’s complaint, they could well satisfy an exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.” Id.
(statement of Sotomayor, J.).
225. Valentine v. Collier, 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020). Judge Davis “reluctantly concur[red]
in the judgment . . . because conditions ha[d] dramatically changed in the prison since the preliminary
injunction issued.” Id. (Davis, J., concurring in the judgment).
226. Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1175 (S.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d, 993 F.3d 270 (5th
Cir. 2021).
227. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020).
228. Id. at 161–62.
229. Id. at 161; see also id. (“The district court made much of TDCJ’s ‘acknowledgment that the
existing grievance process was inadequate in light of COVID-19 and the implementation of a new set of
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“But even if Plaintiffs could surmount the PLRA,” the panel
concluded, “their Eighth Amendment claim” was likely to fail given the
“affirmative steps” TDCJ had taken.230 The panel acknowledged several
TDCJ omissions: it had “failed to enforce social distancing in the Pack
Unit, particularly in the showers”; it “did not increase the janitorial staff’s
access to training or supplies”; its “staff regularly violated the mask
policy”; sanitation and mask-wearing were substandard in the prison
laundry; there was a lack of hand sanitizer and working sinks; there was
no contact-tracing plan; and the testing “turnaround time . . . was between
one and two weeks at the start of the pandemic.”231 Still, the panel
concluded that Judge Ellison had “held TDCJ to a higher standard than
the Constitution imposes” and that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not
enact the CDC guidelines.”232 “To be sure,” the panel wrote, “the district
court identified lapses in TDCJ’s response to COVID-19. As a matter of
policy, TDCJ could have done more to protect vulnerable inmates in the
Pack Unit. But federal judges are not policymakers.”233
On November 16, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court denied an application
to vacate the stay.234 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan,
dissented.235 She noted that “[g]iven the speed at which the contagion
spread, the 160-day grievance process offered no realistic prospect of
relief.”236 She also wrote that the “the Fifth Circuit’s analysis makes clear
that it substituted its own view of the facts for that of the District Court”
on the Eighth Amendment question.237 Further, she highlighted a few
facts that had come out at trial, such as the fact that one prisoner had been
transferred immediately after 14 days elapsed even though he was still
symptomatic,238 and that one warden “was not concerned about assigning
cleaning duties” to wheelchair-bound prisoners “because a disabled
inmate ‘could put a broom against his neck and push it with a
wheelchair.’”239
On March 26, 2021, the Fifth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction,
reversed the district court’s judgment, and entered judgment for the state
defendants.240 All three judges on the panel concluded that the
procedures.’ But inadequate is not a synonym for unavailable.” (citation omitted)).
230. Id. at 162–64.
231. Id. at 164.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 165.
234. Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57 (2020) (mem.).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
237. Id. at 61.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 59.
240. Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 277, 291 (5th Cir. 2021).
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defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation, with the majority ultimately concluding, essentially, that the
defendants could not be said to have violated the Eighth Amendment for
having done “their best.”241
2. Miami-Dade’s Metro West Detention Center
Another combination habeas–civil rights putative class action, Swain
v. Junior, was filed on April 5, 2020, following a COVID-19 outbreak at
a Miami-Dade County jail.242 Judge Kathleen Williams entered a TRO
two days later.243 On April 29, Judge Williams granted the plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction in part, ordering the defendants to
take specific steps at the Metro West Detention Center to increase
detainee safety, including providing for social distancing and imposing
reporting requirements.244 Presumably because Judge Williams denied
relief under § 2241, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent,245 the case evolved
as a § 1983 case.
On May 5, 2020, a motions panel of the Eleventh Circuit stayed the
preliminary injunction.246 The majority wrote that Judge Williams had
“incorrectly collapsed the subjective and objective components” of the
Eighth Amendment test, “treat[ing] the increase in COVID-19 infections
as proof that the defendants deliberately disregarded an intolerable
risk.”247 The majority also relied on an expert report ordered by Judge
Williams for the proposition that the jail officials were “doing their best”
and had “implemented many measures to curb the spread of the virus.”248
In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, the majority also
concluded that the other factors weighed in the jail officials’ favor,
including that they would “be irreparably injured absent a stay” because
they would “lose the discretion vested in them under state law to allocate
scarce resources.”249 The majority added that the district court had also
“likely erred” in failing to address exhaustion under the PLRA.250

241. See id. at 289 n.38 (quoting Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020)). Judge
Oldham concurred in the judgment, chiding the majority for including positive dicta about the district
judge’s handling of the case. Id. at 291–95.
242. Petition and Complaint, Swain v. Junior, No. 20-cv-21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2020), D.E. 1.
243. Order, Swain, No. 20-cv-21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2020), D.E. 25.
244. Swain v. Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1317–18 (S.D. Fla. 2020), vacated, 961 F.3d 1276.
At the time, at least 163 detainees and 17 staff members had been infected. Id. 1292.
245. See id. at 1314–17; see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1086 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020).
246. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1085.
247. Id. at 1089.
248. Id. (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 1090; see id. at 1091.
250. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1091–92. Judge Wilson dissented. Id. at 1092–93.
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On June 15, 2020, a merits panel of the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction.251 The majority noted that the jail officials “had
purchased and installed ionizers to purify the air and body-heat cameras
to measure inmates’ temperatures, . . . had begun testing even
asymptomatic inmates,” had released “nearly 900 inmates” (bringing the
population “to less than 70% of its capacity”), and “would continue
working to reduce the inmate population.”252 Nevertheless, the majority
acknowledged that, per the detainees, it was still “difficult or impossible
to distance from other inmates in certain spaces or during certain times of
the day.”253
The majority observed that the district court’s order had focused on
“the fact that COVID-19 was continuing to spread” and “the impossibility
of achieving adequate social distancing.”254 This was an error, the
majority stated, because neither of these factors, in its view, established
Eighth Amendment subjective indifference.255 “Failing to do the
‘impossible’ doesn’t evince indifference,” the majority wrote, “let alone
deliberate indifference.”256 Indeed, it observed, the jail officials had taken
“numerous other measures—besides social distancing—to mitigate the
spread of the virus.”257 The majority added that the district court erred in
failing to address PLRA exhaustion258 and in applying the other three
preliminary-injunction factors.259
In her dissent, Judge Beverly Martin found no evidence of an abuse of
discretion by the district court, as the record demonstrated that the
defendants had “knowingly maintained conditions” that created “an
impermissibly high risk of illness and death” both “by maintaining a
dangerously high jail population” and “by failing to implement needed
safety measures.”260 Despite being aware of the risks, Judge Martin
wrote, they “continued to detain significantly more people than Metro
West can safely hold during this pandemic,” making detainees “much

251. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020). Judge Beverly Martin dissented. Id.
at 1294.
252. Id. at 1282.
253. Id. at 1283.
254. Id. at 1286.
255. Id. at 1287.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1289.
258. Id. at 1291.
259. Id. at 1292–94. The majority chided the District Court for failing to make findings regarding
whether the detainees would suffer irreparable injury even in the absence of the preliminary injunction
given the steps that the jail officials were already taking. Id. at 1292–93. It also concluded that the District
Court had given “insufficient consideration to the burdens with which the injunction would saddle the
defendants.” Id. at 1293.
260. Id. at 1296 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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more likely to contract COVID-19.”261 Their “knowing failure,” she
argued, “sits comfortably at the heart of what our Court considers to be
deliberate indifference.”262
D. The Overall Timeline
What did this progression look like in aggregate? I have arranged the
key milestones below, highlighting victories (or what were primarily
victories) for incarcerated people in green and defeats (or what were
primarily defeats) in yellow:

Date
3/30/2020
4/2/2020
4/5/2020
4/7/2020
4/10/2020
4/13/2020
4/16/2020
4/17/2020
4/17/2020
4/21/2020
4/22/2020
4/22/2020
4/27/2020
4/29/2020
4/30/2020
5/4/2020
5/11/2020

Case
Valentine
Money
Swain
Swain
Money
Wilson
Valentine
Cameron
Cameron
Cameron
Wilson
Valentine
Martinez-Brooks
Swain
Ahlman
Wilson
Swain

Court
S.D. Tex.
N.D. Ill.
S.D. Fla.
S.D. Fla.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Ohio
S.D. Tex.
E.D. Mich.
E.D. Mich.
E.D. Mich.
N.D. Ohio
5th Cir.
D. Conn.
S.D. Fla.
C.D. Cal.
6th Cir.
11th Cir.

Event
Case filed
Case filed
Case filed
TRO granted
PI denied
Case filed
PI granted
Case filed
TRO granted
PI granted
PI granted
PI stayed
Case filed
PI granted
Case filed
Stay application denied
PI stayed

261. Id.
262. Id. at 1296–97 (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.
1985)).
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5/12/2020

Martinez-Brooks

D. Conn.

5/14/2020
5/16/2020
5/19/2020
5/26/2020
5/26/2020
5/26/2020

Valentine
Torres
Wilson
Wilson
Cameron
Ahlman

Sup. Ct.
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Ohio
Sup. Ct.
6th Cir.
C.D. Cal.

6/1/2020
6/4/2020
6/9/2020

Wilson
Wilson
Wilson

6th Cir.
Sup. Ct.
6th Cir.

6/11/2020

Cameron

6th Cir.

6/12/2020
6/15/2020

Ahlman
Swain

9th Cir.
11th Cir.

6/26/2020
6/29/2020
7/9/2020
7/14/2020
8/5/2020
9/29/2020
10/8/2020
10/13/2020

Ahlman
Ahlman
Cameron
Torres
Ahlman
Valentine
Torres
Valentine

C.D. Cal.
9th Cir.
6th Cir.
C.D. Cal.
Sup. Ct.
S.D. Tex.
C.D. Cal.
5th Cir.

11/16/2020

Valentine

Sup. Ct.

35

TRO granted
Application to vacate stay
denied
Case filed
Motion to enforce granted
Stay application denied
Stay application denied
PI granted
Renewed stay application
denied
Administrative stay
PI vacated
Renewed stay application
granted
Stay application denied;
limited remand
PI vacated
Application to dissolve PI
denied
Stay application denied
PI vacated
PI granted
PI stayed
Permanent injunction entered

Motion to enforce granted
Permanent injunction stayed
Application to vacate stay
denied

Figure 1. Developments in Key COVID-19 Cases
As this table shows, these cases progressed (generally speaking) from
early success in the lower courts to failure on appeal, beginning in May
and early June of 2020. If we look at the progression of COVID-19 deaths
over roughly the same period,263 we see that the judicial tide started to
turn around the same time as COVID-19 deaths nationally were beginning
to bottom out from the first wave.264 Correlation is not causation, of

263. The COVID Tracking Project, THE ATLANTIC, https://covidtracking.com/data/download (last
visited Dec. 30, 2020).
264. I use deaths rather than positive infections given both the slow speed at which testing ramped
up and the greater salience of this figure for the stakes involved.
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course, and the cases themselves involved significant doctrinal questions
on which judges could disagree. This Article turns to those doctrinal
questions now.

Daily Reported COVID-19 Deaths, 3/1/20 - 11/16/20
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0

Figure 2. Daily Reported COVID-19 Deaths During Span of Key Litigation
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III. KEY TENSIONS IN THE COVID-19 CASES
The major COVID-19 prison and jail cases have a few key things in
common: they all brought Eighth Amendment claims (and almost all
brought partial habeas claims) to address assertedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement through class-wide (or otherwise
representative) litigation in federal court. In some instances, the alleged
violations were in state facilities, while in others, the facilities were
federal. In the most successful of these time-sensitive cases, litigants and
courts wrestled with what appropriate preliminary relief would look like
while litigation proceeded. The progression of these cases as a whole
reflects larger tensions between rights and remedies, not only in the
context of the American carceral state, but also in federal court litigation
over asserted constitutional harms more broadly.
This Part discusses a series of related doctrinal tensions that sometimes
act as stumbling blocks for courts and litigants: (A) whether these suits
could be brought in habeas; (B) the scope of Eight Amendment
“deliberate indifference” doctrine in this context; (C) the availability of
class-wide relief; (D) federalism and comity concerns, and how those
concerns may have been sourced through exhaustion doctrine; (E)
questions of whether temporary release could be ordered as a form of
preliminary rather than final relief; and (F) the interplay between rights
and remedies.
A. Habeas, Conditions of Confinement, and the PLRA
AEDPA makes a steep road for any prisoner—and especially any state
prisoner—seeking to claim that he was convicted or sentenced in
violation of federal law.265 But what about a prisoner whose claim has
nothing to do with the legality of his conviction or sentence, but who
instead—like the hypothetical prisoner in the Introduction whose prison
is falling into a sinkhole—asserts that while his sentence may be justified,
serving it in this particular prison under the current conditions itself
violates federal law? That prisoner, whether state or federal, is certainly
not bringing a traditional habeas claim under § 2254 or § 2255. At the
same time, however, that prisoner is still arguing that there is something
unlawful about his current detention.
The initial complexity of these novel arguments arises from the
prisoner claiming the conditions of his confinement make his detention
illegal. This alone is common. Take, for example, a prisoner who claims
that his current confinement exposes him to dangerous levels of second-

265. See supra Section I.A.
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hand tobacco smoke, “jeopardizing his health” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.266 This prisoner is asserting that his current detention is
unlawful to the extent that it imposes this harm on him. 267 Yet no one
assumes that the remedy for this state of affairs is “release . . . from
custody.”268
The answer in that situation, if the challenged condition is in fact
unlawful, is instead to require the prison to remedy that condition—for
example, through an injunction requiring prison officials to protect
unwilling prisoners from second-hand smoke.269 State prisoners
challenging these and other kinds of internally remediable conditions
generally bring such claims under § 1983.270 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly reserved the question of whether such mine-run conditions-ofconfinement claims can be brought via habeas271 while the circuit courts
have split on this issue.272 Even the circuits that have ruled against
prisoners, however, may not have encountered a situation in which
assertedly unconstitutional conditions cannot practically be remedied
inside the prison walls.273
COVID-19, like the sinking-prison
266. E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993).
267. See id.
268. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
269. See, e.g., Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 35.
270. Federal prisoners cannot bring such claims under § 1983 because federal prison wardens are
not acting “under color of” state law. Nevertheless, they can potentially seek injunctive and declaratory
relief under the Eighth Amendment directly via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, given that asserted Eighth Amendment
violations in federal prisons necessarily raise federal questions. Section 1331, after all, provides for
federal district courts to have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” And federal courts have long been recognized to have the authority to
enjoin unconstitutional acts by federal (and state) officials. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–91 (1949) (federal); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605,
619–21 (1912) (federal); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824) (state); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)
(noting that plaintiffs were “challeng[ing] large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of
confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners” and that, “[t]o address those kinds of decisions, detainees
may seek injunctive relief”). The Eighth Amendment has also been held to provide an implied damages
remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), see Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 17 (1980), these kinds of claims are increasingly difficult to bring successfully, see Abbasi,
137 S.Ct. at 1854–63.
271. See Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1862–63; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979); Preiser, 411
U.S. at 499. But see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484, 490 (1969); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249, 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).
272. See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); see also
Order on Pls. Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 46, Swain v. Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1287 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29,
2020) (No. 20-cv-21457), D.E. 100 (noting split).
273. Compare, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his Court
has held that even if a prisoner proves an allegation of mistreatment in prison that amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment, he is not entitled to release. The appropriate Eleventh Circuit relief from prison
conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment during legal incarceration is to require the discontinuance
of any improper practices, or to require correction of any condition causing cruel and unusual
punishment.” (citations omitted)), with Order on Pls. Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 46–47, Swain v. Junior,
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hypothetical, makes that problem concrete.
For prisoners such as those in the hypothetical sinking prison, bringing
a claim under § 1983 (or directly under the Eighth Amendment via § 1331
jurisdiction) carries a special pitfall: the PLRA. As noted above, the
PLRA limits “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison
conditions”274 in multiple ways.275 Habeas offers a potential pathway
around this problem because the PLRA expressly excludes “habeas
corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in
prison.”276
A prisoner who sues his prison asking for better cleaning supplies does
not challenge “the fact or duration of [his] confinement,” but a prisoner
who brings a habeas claim alleging that he cannot constitutionally be
confined in a given facility (for example, in the COVID-19 or sinkhole
scenario) arguably does. This prisoner levels an attack that is “just as
close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s
conviction, for it goes directly to the constitutionality of his physical
confinement itself and seeks either immediate release from that
confinement or the shortening of its duration.”277 From this perspective,
seeking relief via habeas corpus (rather than a civil-rights action) is more
consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance on the proper remedial
channels.278
One may counter that because the prisoner will likely have to concede
that he can constitutionally be confined somewhere—for example, a
prison that is not sinking into the ground and rapidly filling with water—
he is seeking neither immediate release from all custody nor the
shortening of his sentence. From this perspective, the prisoner is really
just quarreling with the conditions of his confinement—a question that
some courts doubt can be considered in habeas at all.279 Such claims have
been characterized by some as “Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement

457 F. Supp. 3d 1287 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-21457), D.E. 100 (noting that Gomez “left
open the question of whether habeas would be available in a context where there was no constitutional
manner of continued confinement” and observing that other courts have suggested that this is an
appropriate reading).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
275. See supra Section I.B.
276. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
277. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).; cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1863 (2017) (noting that “[a] successful habeas petition would have required [federal] officials to place
[a putative class of hundreds] in less-restrictive conditions immediately” without suggesting any of kind
of PLRA problem).
278. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490 (“Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific
determination must override the general terms of § 1983.”).
279. E.g., Rice v. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021).
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litigation in disguise,”280 and there is a circuit split over whether habeas
relief is available to prisoners who raise such conditions-related
claims.281 This counterargument sets up a Scylla and Charybdis: go the
civil-rights route and face the PLRA; go the habeas route and get told that
you’re not really challenging your confinement and that you’re not
allowed to raise these kinds of arguments in habeas in the first place.
The natural reply to at least the first problem—the assertion that the
prisoner is not really challenging his confinement, but rather quibbling
over conditions—is that the habeas claims prisoners brought during the
pandemic were different from classic conditions-of-confinement cases in
a crucial way: they could be remedied only with the standard habeas
remedy of release from present confinement, whereas classic conditions
claims can be resolved with realistic intramural reforms.282
This answer to the counterargument was essentially the theory that the
Sixth Circuit adopted in Wilson—the subsidiary victory that the prisoners
won there. The majority observed that while the BOP had sought to cast
the case as a classic conditions-of-confinement challenge, the prisoners
were not “arguing that there are particular procedures or safeguards that
the BOP should put in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19
throughout Elkton.”283 Instead, they were claiming “that there were no
conditions of confinement sufficient to prevent irreparable constitutional
injury at Elkton.”284 In other words, they sought “release,” and circuit
precedent confirmed that “where a petitioner claims that no set of
conditions would be constitutionally sufficient the claim should be
construed as challenging the fact or extent, rather than the conditions, of
the confinement.”285
Mathematically, this logic makes sense. Even if a prisoner’s right is to
release from only one specific island in the carceral archipelago, that
280. Cf. Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 80.
281. See Rice, 985 F.3d at 1070 n.2 (acknowledging split with Sixth Circuit’s decision in Wilson);
see also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 27 & n.171.
282. I use the word “realistic” because, in theory, prison officials can solve any problem with
enough time, money, and technological advancement. But if the only way to solve the problem is to turn
back time, invent a vaccine, or build a new prison, prisoners have a much better argument that those are
not real-world “conditions” that prison officials can realistically fix. On the other hand, if the entire
problem is remediable with more cleaning supplies, prison officials can presumably defeat habeas
jurisdiction by noting the availability of cleaning supplies. (They might expose themselves to civil-rights
liability if they failed to do so, but not to a habeas issue.)
283. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 2020).
284. Id. at 838.
285. Id.; accord id. at 846 (Cole, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also MartinezBrooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 433–34 (D. Conn. 2020) (“The Petitioners in this case are
challenging the conditions of their confinement but they are also challenging the ‘fact . . . of confinement
in prison.’ . . . In short, Petitioners contend that the fact of their confinement in prison itself amounts to
an Eighth Amendment violation under these circumstances, and nothing short of an order ending their
confinement at FCI Danbury will alleviate that violation.”).
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constitutes a decrease (even if a small one) in the government’s overall
power to confine him. Decreasing the number of facilities where a
government may permissibly incarcerate a person from 100 to 99 is a
“quantum change in the level of custody,”286 just as the phrases “you can
hold him anywhere” and “you may be able to hold him elsewhere but you
can’t hold him there” are not equivalent statements. In the COVID-19
cases, like the sinkhole scenario, the “condition” that violates the Eighth
Amendment is the condition of being held in that particular prison, pure
and simple. The only solution is release from that prison—a classic
habeas remedy, in other words.
The focus on that specific remedy accounts at least for why these kinds
of claims properly challenge the “fact or duration of confinement” for
purposes of the PLRA.287 But what about circuits where it is blackletter
law that conditions-of-confinement claims cannot be brought via
habeas?288 An answer to this secondary question is that cases like the
COVID-19 cases are not conditions-of-confinement cases “in disguise”
at all. Rather, they also qualify as fact-or-duration challenges in an
overlapping sense—the sense that the Supreme Court employed when it
wrote in Preiser that “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state
prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement,
and that specific determination must override the general terms of §
1983.”289 Specifically, COVID-19 habeas claims should be understood
as falling under two established (if not universally accepted) classes of
habeas claims, both of which arise under § 2241: (1) challenges to the
execution or manner of a sentence or (2) challenges to a place of
confinement.
With regard to the first class of habeas claims, many federal circuits
recognize that § 2241 may be used to challenge “the execution or manner
in which [a] sentence is served.”290 Some (relatively) noncontroversial
challenges falling under this rubric include the computation of a
prisoner’s sentence or good-time credits or the way that a prison system
286. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v.
Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
288. See Rice v. Gonzalez, 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021); McIntosh v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991); cf.
Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006).
289. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
290. United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001); see Woodall v. Fed. Bur. of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2005); Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008)
(including conditions); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Campbell,
204 F.3d 861, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2000) (also allowing “conditions” claims); cf. United States v. Mares, 868
F.2d 151, 151 (5th Cir. 1989). But cf. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
difference between a claim of entitlement to be released, and an opportunity to be considered for release,
also affects the choice between § 2241 and a mundane civil action.”).
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runs the parole or disciplinary process.291 Because they implicate how
long a person must be in prison, these examples suggest that executionor-manner claims are largely a subset of fact-or-duration claims. That
said, some courts have understood them to encompass claims that do not
directly impact the fact or duration of a prison sentence as well.292 Here,
as previously discussed, COVID-19 claims would implicate the fact or
duration of confinement.
As for the second category, prisoners in the COVID-19 (or sinkhole)
context might also cast their claims as place-of-confinement suits. Such
claims have a long vintage—in the 1890s, the Supreme Court addressed
two such cases, the more commonly cited of which is In re Bonner.293 In
that case, the petitioner, John Bonner, was imprisoned in a state
penitentiary in Iowa.294 He had been convicted of violating a federal law
that authorized as punishment no more than a $1,000 fine and “one year”
in prison.295 The problem was that separate federal laws provided for
imprisonment in a state penitentiary only when the person was convicted
of a federal crime and “sentenced to imprisonment for a period longer
than one year” or “at hard labor.”296 “It follow[ed] that the court had no
jurisdiction to” imprison Bonner in a state penitentiary “when the
imprisonment [wa]s not ordered for a period longer than one year or at
291. E.g., Thompson, 525 F.3d at 209; Mares, 868 F.2d at 151; Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d
442, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (parole procedures); Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013) (goodtime credits); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88 (challenge to good-time credits proper only under
habeas, not § 1983).
292. E.g., Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864–65; Thompson, 525 F.3d at 209; Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704
F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013). The one area where these types of claims are likely be unavailable in
habeas is when they seek to challenge a method of capital punishment (or “execution” in a different sense
of the word). See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 879 (2015) (stating that a previous case, Hill v.
McDonough, “held that a method-of-execution claim must be brought under § 1983 because such a claim
does not attack the validity of the prisoner’s conviction or death sentence”). But see Hill v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006) (“The question before us is whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an action
for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or whether it may
proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (emphasis added)); id. at 579; Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637, 639-640, 643–646 (2004). While some courts have taken this logic to foreclose even
method-of-execution suits via habeas that would render the prisoner’s death sentence unconstitutional,
see In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454, 465–66 (6th Cir. 2017), there is no reason that this rule should apply
outside of the capital-punishment context, given that the motivating rationale was the Glossip Court’s
death-penalty specific concern “that a state could be left without any lawful means of execution,” id. at
462; see also Glossip, 576 U.S. at 880–81. Prisoners bringing § 2241 claims in light of COVID-19 are
not similarly situated, as there is no likelihood that that their claims could render incarceration de facto
unconstitutional. For these kinds of claims, cases like Hill and McDonough still suggest at least the
alternate availability of habeas, given that prisoners are challenging their confinement itself, not “merely”
its conditions. See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; see also id. at 644–46; Hill, 547 U.S. at 580–81; Wilson v.
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020); Adams v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 481, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2011).
293. 151 U.S. 242 (1894). The other, which Bonner discussed, is In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890).
294. Bonner, 151 U.S. at 254.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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hard labor.”297 Wherever Bonner could properly be imprisoned, he could
not be imprisoned in “one of these institutions.”298
Though the Government conceded that Bonner “should not have been
sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary,” it argued that “the
judgment and sentence [we]re not for that cause void so as to entitle the
petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus for his discharge.”299 The Court
disagreed. It observed that, according to the Government’s argument,
“[i]t would be as well, and be equally within its authority, for the court to
order the imprisonment to be in the guardhouse of a fort, or the hulks of
a prison-ship, or in any other place not specified in the law.”300 Habeas
was therefore proper.301
For the potential COVID-19 plaintiff, Bonner suggests that even when
a person may be permissibly imprisoned under a valid conviction for the
full duration of their sentence, they may nevertheless bring a claim via
habeas to remove them from imprisonment in a particular place where
they may not permissibly serve that sentence.302 The challenge of Bonner,
meanwhile, is its reliance on the sentencing court’s jurisdiction, as
opposed to the constitutional validity of the current confinement.303
Clearly, a judge who sentenced a plaintiff to incarceration at a place that
experienced a runaway COVID-19 outbreak months or years later was not
acting without jurisdiction because of that subsequent development.
Nevertheless, federal appellate courts have indicated that Bonner’s
rationale supports § 2241 jurisdiction in at least some related contexts.304
The Sixth Circuit itself did so in a 1991 case,305 though in Wilson the
majority stated (in what is technically dicta) that this earlier holding
would not extend to permit a court exercising § 2241 jurisdiction to
require that a prisoner be transferred to another facility.306 This may
297. Id. at 254–55.
298. Id. at 255.
299. Id. at 256.
300. Id.
301. See id. at 256, 262.
302. See id.
303. See, e.g., id. at 256, 259.
304. See, e.g., Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Montez attacks the
execution of his sentence as it affects the fact or duration of his confinement in Colorado. Such an attack,
focusing on where his sentence will be served, seems to fit better under the rubric of § 2241.”); Kiyemba
v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The detainees’ claims are not in the nature of an action
barred by § 2241(e)(2) because, based upon longstanding precedents, it is clear they allege a proper claim
for habeas relief, specifically an order barring their transfer to or from a place of incarceration.”).
305. See United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991).
306. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 839, 839 n.3. There, the court sought to cabin a prior case, Jalili, in which
it had previously ruled that a district court had erred in addressing a place-of-confinement challenge under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, holding that “[b]ecause defendant Jalili is challenging the manner in which the sentence
was being executed, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, Section 2255 does not apply.” 925 F.2d
at 893. The Wilson panel noted that “Jalili was not simply requesting transfer to another BOP facility,”
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ultimately be a distinction without a meaningful difference: just because
a district court cannot order prisoners transferred to another facility does
not mean that, if it orders prisoners released because of unconstitutional
conditions at their current facility, the prison cannot moot out the case (at
least as applied to some of them) by transferring them to other,
constitutionally adequate facilities.
In any event, whether cast as execution-or-manner claims or place-ofconfinement claims, § 2241 offers specific, well-established analogies to
show that a COVID-19 habeas claim challenges the fact or duration of a
prisoner’s confinement in a particular place. Such a claim does so not
only for purposes of avoiding the PLRA, but also for purposes of invoking
habeas jurisdiction regardless of whether “conditions” are part of the
argument. Consequently, prisoners seeking to avoid the PLRA and
invoke habeas jurisdiction may wish to make two overlapping arguments
(not currently accepted in all jurisdictions) about why they are
challenging the fact or length of their incarceration. Not all jurisdictions
currently accept both justifications. But while the government may have
the legal authority to imprison the person for a certain period of time
somewhere, the argument goes, habeas properly comes into play—and the
PLRA properly does not—because it does not have the legal authority to
imprison that person where it is currently doing so.
B. The Scope of the Eighth Amendment Right
Habeas claims based on the Eighth Amendment also run headlong into
the doctrinal hurdles raised by the limited scope of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.307 As previously explained, because prisoners must
challenge the constitutional validity of their confinement itself to fit under
habeas and avoid the PLRA, the asserted Eighth Amendment violations
must go to the heart of the confinement and not be remediable by any
realistic intramural mitigation.308 In other words, the violation must be
but rather “was arguing that he should not be placed in a higher-security facility contrary to the district
court’s explicit direction that he serve his sentence at a community treatment center.” Wilson, 961 F.3d at
839 n.3. “This,” the Wilson court stated, “was properly a challenge to the execution of the district court’s
sentence and not an invitation for any petitioners seeking transfer to another facility to bring a claim under
§ 2241.” Id.
307. In the context of pretrial detainees, whose claims are governed by the Fourteenth rather than
the Eighth Amendment, there is an open question (and circuit split) as to whether the same test applies.
See, e.g., Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Most courts
have dodged this question by assuming that the answer is the same regardless of which test they apply
and then proceeding to focus on the Eighth Amendment analysis. E.g., id. at 984–88; see supra note 183.
This Article (and, specifically, this Section) focuses on the Eighth Amendment framework accordingly,
though it is not clear that this analysis formally applies to people who are incarcerated but have not been
convicted.
308. Again, I use the word “realistic” because it is no meaningful answer to say that officials can
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intrinsic to the confinement itself at the relevant point in time. COVID
outbreaks in prisons illustrate how this can be true: at least in some
settings—whether because the nature of a particular facility or because a
particular outbreak has gained enough of a foothold—there is no fixing
things within the prison walls.
The crux of any Eighth Amendment claim in this context is the
allegation that prison authorities have engaged in “deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners,” which qualifies as a violation of
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment.309 For there to be a violation, the prisoner need not be
actually harmed: authorities may not consciously disregard that someone
is imprisoned “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.”310 Such risks include exposure to infectious disease.311
Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims must satisfy both
parts of a two-pronged test: an objective prong and a subjective prong.312
First, the plaintiff “must show that he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”313 Second, he must show that
“the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.”314
What a prison official actually knew, the Supreme Court has explained,
“is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence” such as “the very fact that the
risk was obvious.”315 Willful blindness, accordingly, is not an escape
rectify the conditions internally by doing something unrealistic, such as inventing a vaccine or going back
in time to stop COVID-19 from spreading. See supra note 282.
309. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being. The rationale for this principle is simple enough:
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders
him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g.,
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by the Eighth Amendment . . . . The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s
knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.”).
310. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
311. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978);
see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (noting that while the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable
prisons,” it does not “permit inhumane ones,” and thus requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care” and that their safety is adequately protected
(citation omitted)).
312. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 837; see also id. at 840 (requiring “consciousness of a risk”).
315. Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
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hatch.316 For that reason, litigation itself can put a prison official on
notice—but “to establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must
demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of the
litigation and into the future.”317
It is hard, in the context of COVID-19, to argue that the objective prong
of the test is not satisfied, though that has not stopped some prison
authorities from trying.318 Courts have almost uniformly rejected these
arguments.319 The subjective prong is where the tension lies.
Often, in deliberate-indifference cases, the problem with establishing
subjective indifference hinges on the need to show “knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.”320 That is because the doctrine “is
focused on the individual intent of prison officials.”321 For example,
asking whether the prison doctor unconstitutionally denied someone a
pain-relieving treatment would mean asking whether she knew that the
patient was indeed in pain and that other treatments were not working or
would not work. In the COVID-19 scenario, by contrast, the risk was
systemic and obvious, and the alleged indifference was “institutional.”322
The question was whether the institutions did enough to keep the
incarcerated people safe against a significant risk that they were plainly
aware of.
Litigants have met with very limited success on this question. Where
they have made tentative progress in the trial courts, meanwhile, those
gains have been reversed by appellate courts. Essentially, the courts have
treated some official-sounding “plan”—any plan—as satisfactory, even
where there are indications that the response is insufficient or that the
institution has not in fact followed its own protocols.
The Elkton case is illustrative: the Sixth Circuit majority credited the
BOP’s “six-phase action plan to reduce the risk of COVID-19 spread at

316. See id. at 843 n.8 (giving example of prison official who “knows that some diseases are
communicable and that a single need is being used to administer flu shots” yet “refuses to listen to a
subordinate who he strongly suspects” will discuss the danger).
317. Id. at 846; see id. n.9 (noting that “prison officials who state during the litigation that they will
not take reasonable measures to abate an intolerable risk of which they are aware” cannot “claim to be
subjectively blameless” and that courts “may take such developments into account”).
318. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Garrett & Kovarsky,
supra note 1, at 46–47.
319. E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d at 840; Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476, 507 (D.N.J.
2020); see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
320. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
321. Godfrey, supra note 4, at 155.
322. Cf. id. at 154 (noting that “[f]ederal courts have provided little direction in how a prisoner can
demonstrate the deliberate indifference of an institution, that is, the deliberate indifference of the prison
system that confines him”), id. at 186-94 (offering potential sources of proof “to establish institutional
knowledge”).
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Elkton,”323 while the dissenting judge observed that this “phrase
sound[ed] good on paper” but that “look[ing] behind the curtain” showed
the “plan” was “far less impressive than its title suggests.” 324 Few
institutions, meanwhile, have been reckless enough not to have a plan in
place, and in fact most seem to have taken at least some steps.325
Part of the problem, as other scholars have noted, is that subjective
indifference has always been a high hurdle, and many federal appellate
courts have raised it even higher since the Supreme Court laid out the
standard in Farmer in 1994.326 There are good arguments that these
approaches are inconsistent with Farmer,327 but these arguments have not
gained traction, least of all in the COVID-19 cases. While you might
think that prison officials who persist in an approach that they know is
doomed to fail are consciously disregarding a serious risk to prisoner
wellbeing, the response from appellate courts has been closer to how most
professors treat pass/fail classes: so long as you turn in something legible,
you pass.328
To give prison officials fair credit, there is only so much that they could
have been expected to do intramurally. COVID-19 is a dangerous and
highly communicable disease; it thrives in congregate, indoor
environments like nursing homes and especially lower-security prisons,
where social distancing is effectively impossible.329 For that reason, one
323. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 841; see also Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2020);
Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2020); Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 988
(6th Cir. 2020); Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1131–32 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
324. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 848 (Cole, C.J., dissenting); see also Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 991–92
(Cole, C.J., dissenting) (noting indications that prison was simply putting on a show for a court-ordered
inspection and meanwhile taking other steps that ran directly contrary to best practices, such as
transferring prisoners who raised concerns about prison hygiene or their own symptoms to less hygienic
environments).
325. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 1, at 11 (“For their part, corrections administrators around the
country began implementing measures to address the threat. Family visits were canceled, programs were
suspended, and lockdowns were instituted for all residents not performing essential labor. A flurry of
additional policies were also adopted, including those establishing enhanced cleaning protocols; providing
for the distribution of masks, gloves, and cleaning supplies; requiring isolation of the infected; limiting
movement and transfers between facilities; and ordering residents to socially distance as much as
possible.”).
326. Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 71, 79–80, 82.
327. E.g., id. at 80 n.50. Farmer has also shown itself susceptible to critique, e.g., Dolovich, supra
note 4, at 895–907, but given this Article’s goals, I take it as a given.
328. See, e.g., Money, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (“The record simply does not support any suggestion
that Defendants have turned the kind of blind eye and deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate
‘total unconcern’ for the inmates’ welfare.” (citation omitted)).
329. See, e.g., Philip D. Sloane, Cruise Ships, Nursing Homes, and Prisons as COVID-19
Epicenters: A “Wicked Problem” With Breakthrough Solutions?, 21 J. AM. MED. DIR. ASSOC. 958 (2020);
Anna Flagg & Joseph Neff, Why Jails Are So Important in the Fight Against Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/upshot/coronavirus-jails-prisons.html; Amanda
Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, If Inaction Continues, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion/coronavirus-in-jails.html.
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can see why officials’ multistep plans were destined to be insufficient.
But that is the crux of the paradigmatic prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
COVID-19 habeas claim: the Eighth Amendment requires reasonably
responsive action, and the only reasonably responsive action is release
from an environment in which social distancing is impossible. Just as a
prison doctor who continued treating a prisoner with a medication known
to be ineffective to treat the prisoner’s disease would be deliberately
indifferent, so too would a warden who continued implementing a
multistep “plan” known to be ineffective.330 This was the upshot of the
rulings in the FCI Danbury and FCI Lompoc litigation: where even the
Attorney General had recognized that releasing prisoners to home
confinement was necessary to stanch the outbreak, not doing so (or doing
so in the most recalcitrant way possible) was deliberately indifferent.331
It was like telling a prisoner whose diagnosis required chemotherapy that
you had a multiphase plan to ensure he received lots of antibiotics and
vitamins. It wasn’t nothing; it just wasn’t the thing that you knew was
necessary, either.
Swain v. Junior—the Miami-Dade jail case—illustrates this tension
well.332 On the one hand, the majority that vacated the preliminary
injunction could reasonably point to the fact that the jail officials really
had taken some decent steps—far more, in fact, than many of their
colleagues elsewhere.333 They had purchased advanced diagnostic and
air-purifying tools, had tested fairly rigorously, and had released nearly
900 detainees, with more evidently to come.334 That does not mean that
the detainees and the dissent were incorrect, however, in observing that
these efforts alone were insufficient to reduce the risk: social distancing
was still impossible.335 What COVID-19 made plain was that being
locked inside a government compound with a lot of other people can itself
pose a substantial risk of harm, and leaving people locked inside there
despite knowing that fact can and should give rise to a colorable Eighth
Amendment claim.
COVID-19 presents, of course, a novel situation for prison officials, as
it has for the world—and no prison to my knowledge has faced the
330. See, e.g., Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (“continuing to treat him with
Methotrexate after Darrah had been on the drug for several months without any noticeable improvement”);
Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Intentional failure to provide
service acknowledged to be necessary is the deliberate indifference proscribed by the Constitution.”).
331. See, e.g., Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 442–46 (D. Conn. 2020); Torres v.
Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 740 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D.
Ohio 2020), vacated, Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
332. See supra Section II.D.2.
333. See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020).
334. Id.
335. See id. at 1283 (acknowledging this argument); id. at 1296–97 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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sinkhole hypothetical with which this Article began. But the basic
scenario—the confinement itself causing the unconstitutional
conditions—is not unprecedented. When hurricanes and flooding
threaten a particular prison, for example, it is quite possible that continued
confinement in that place would violate the Eighth Amendment in a way
that no change to the intramural conditions could rectify.336 Likewise,
when Valley Fever menaced prisoners in California, those prisoners too
had colorable claims that their continued confinement violated the Eighth
Amendment, though the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against them on
qualified-immunity grounds without addressing the underlying Eighth
Amendment question.337
Of course, as prison officials are quick to remind plaintiffs, “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”338 And appellate
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have often treated it as a matter
of structural fact—rather than a national (and remediable) disgrace— that
“[j]ails are often crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous places.”339 But
COVID-19 offered the first widespread example of a menace that both:
(1) alarmed society at large enough to upend daily life; and (2) was
demonstrably worsened by incarceration, in the sense that the most
effective prophylaxis available (social distancing) was impossible under
most conditions of confinement.
This was particularly, and
paradoxically, true in the dormitory-style prisons (like the geriatric Texas
“Pack Unit” pictured below) where the lowest-security prisoners—the
people easiest to release without inordinate risk to public safety—are
incarcerated.340

336. Cf., e.g., Kalhan Rosenblatt, Harvey Prompts 5 Texas Prisons to Evacuate Nearly 6,000
Inmates, NBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricaneharvey/harvey-prompts-5-texas-prisons-evacuate-nearly-6-000-inmates-n797086.
337. See Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2019). The Hines court based its ruling
on the fact that (1) “a federal court supervised the officials’ actions,” and (2) the risks involved did not
violate evolving standards of decency “given that millions of free individuals tolerate a heightened risk of
Valley Fever by voluntarily living in California’s Central Valley and elsewhere.” Id. at 1231. Along the
way, the court observed that, given that “the prisoners are confined together, it is especially important that
Valley Fever is not contagious.” Id. at 1226. Unlike many of the COVID-19 cases discussed here, the
prisoners sought money damages under § 1983 rather than release (or transfer) pursuant to a habeas
statute. See id. at 1226. In Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2013), the District Court
granted prisoners’ request for an order excluding medically vulnerable prisoners from an area where they
were at high risk of contracting Valley Fever. Id. at 1229–30. That court also noted the hypothetical of
a prison “so dilapidated that no one could predict when the walls would crumble down.” Id. at 1223.
338. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
339. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 333 (2012).
340. E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833, 840 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting Elkton’s status as a
low-security, dormitory-style facility and the serious risks posed by dormitory-style housing).
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Figure 3. The Texas “Pack Unit”341
The federal prisons, and a great many state authorities, had the power
to implement that prophylaxis by placing prisoners on home confinement,
transferring them to safer facilities, or granting reprieves.342 That their
largely insufficient intramural efforts were deemed sufficient to satisfy
the Eighth Amendment represents a swerve away from actually requiring
liability where an “official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of
a substantial risk of serious harm,”343 such as “when a prison official
knows that some diseases are communicable and that a single needle is
being used to administer flu shots to prisoners but refuses to listen to a
subordinate who he strongly suspects will attempt to explain the
associated risk of transmitting disease.”344 I return to what may account
for this swerve in Section III.F below.

341.
342.
343.
344.
47–49.

Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 2021).
See supra Section I.C.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).
Id. at 843 n.8; see also Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 82; Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at
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C. Class-Wide Adjudication
Another flashpoint that arose in some COVID-19 habeas cases was the
use of class-wide adjudication—a question that can arise in either a
habeas case or a civil-rights case but is more complicated in the habeas
posture.
The threshold issue with regard to habeas cases is that the Supreme
Court “has never addressed whether habeas relief can be pursued in a
class action” or a similar aggregate format.345 While that is true, many
appellate courts have answered that question in the affirmative.346
Furthermore, the Federal Rules that govern Section 2254 and 2255 cases
provide that the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they
are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be
applied to a proceeding under these rules.”347 Although most COVID-19
habeas claims arise under § 2241 rather than §§ 2254, 2255,348 the same
logic holds for § 2241 claims, and authority to apply this same logic likely
stems from 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which directs courts sitting in habeas to
“summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law
and justice require.”349
Leaving that threshold question aside, in civil-rights cases and, to the
extent that Rule 23 is at least applicable by analogy,350 in habeas cases as
well, COVID-19-related claims pass at least some of Rule 23’s tests with
flying colors. To start, the classes are inherently numerous351—prisons
usually house thousands of inmates, a significant fraction of whom are
older and sicker than the general public.352 Furthermore, there are
345. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 858 n.7 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.10 (1984)).
346. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Morgan
v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 112627 (2d Cir. 1974) (judiciary has power, without fully importing Rule 23, “to fashion for habeas actions
appropriate modes of procedure[] by analogy”); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir.
1973); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e conclude that while Rule 23, Fed. R.
Civ. P., does not apply, a representative action may be maintained in the unusual circumstances of this
case, limited to federal prisoners in custody in the district in which the district court sits . . . .”).
347. U.S. Courts, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 12 (as amended to
Dec. 1, 2019) https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules_governing_section_2254_and_2255
_cases_in_the_u.s._district_courts_-_dec_1_2019.pdf.
348. See supra Section III.A.
349. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81 (“These rules apply to proceedings for habeas
corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not specified in a federal statute, the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases; and (B) has previously
conformed to the practice in civil actions.”).
350. See, e.g., Bijeol, 513 F.2d at 967; Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 450 (D.
Conn. 2020) (citing Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1125).
351. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
352. See Matt McKillop & Alex Boucher, Aging Prison Populations Drive Up Costs, PEW TRUSTS
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obvious “questions of law and fact common or fact common to the
class.”353 The extent to which prisoners are at risk of catching COVID19 and the degree to which prison officials have responded adequately to
that risk involve “common contention[s]” that, when determined, “will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of one of the claims
in one stroke.”354
Typicality and adequacy are arguably more difficult to satisfy.
Typicality requires that each named petitioner raise claims that are
“typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”355 In one sense, this will
always be true: petitioners will, like all putative class members, be
incarcerated within the same facility under relatively similar conditions,
and in the case of a subclass, will be medically vulnerable, whether due
to age or pre-existing medical conditions.356 Nevertheless, each
prisoner’s suitability for a particular form of relief may vary. Some may
be strong candidates for home confinement because of health
vulnerabilities, relatively short sentences, solid institutional records, or
strong re-entry plans, while others may be poor candidates because of
good health, long sentences, significant blemishes in their institutional
records, or limited re-entry prospects.
Adequacy—the requirement that named petitioners “fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class”357—follows a similar logic.
On one hand, assuming satisfactory legal counsel is involved, the
petitioners’ interests should be aligned: all seek relief from assertedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement via some ““quantum change
in the level of [their] custody.”358 On the other hand, some petitioners
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/02/20/aging-prisonpopulations-drive-up-costs; Tomoko Udo, Chronic Medical Conditions in U.S. Adults with Incarceration
History, 38 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 217 (2019), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30762401/; Li & Lewis,
supra note 15.
353. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
354. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011); see, e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472
F. Supp. 3d 713, 744 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“The Court finds all class members have been subjected to
significant risk of exposure to COVID-19. Common facts include the process by Respondents in
considering Lompoc inmates for home confinement and compassionate release are common to the entire
putative class, and common questions exist as to whether Respondents’ failure to make prompt and
meaningful use of home confinement and compassionate release in light of the pandemic, and disregard
of inmates’ age and medical conditions in determining eligibility for home confinement and
compassionate release violate the Eighth Amendment.”); cf., e.g., Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780
F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Common issues—such as liability—may be certified, consistent with Rule
23, even where other issues—such as damages—do not lend themselves to classwide proof.”).
355. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
356. See, e.g., Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 452 (D. Conn. 2020) (finding
typicality satisfied “because the process at issue is applicable to all inmates, ‘each member’s claim arises
from the same course of events’—the establishment and operation of this process—’and each class
member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability’” (citation omitted)).
357. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
358. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1

52

Zuckerman: When the Conditions are the Confinement: Eighth Amendment Habeas

2021]

WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT

53

may have strong incentives to push for the maximal relief (release for
everyone, understanding that only the most maximal relief will benefit
them), while others may be willing to accept more limited relief (for
example, because they are more likely to benefit from even minimal
relief).
In addition to Rule 23(a)’s class-action prerequisites, there is potential
debate regarding Rule 23(b)’s separate requirement that the putative class
action fit into one of three (or four) types of class actions. Rule 23(b)(2)
is perhaps the most obvious choice, given that “a common use of Rule
23(b)(2) is in prisoner actions brought to challenge various practices or
rules in the prisons on the ground that they violate the constitution.”359
To satisfy Rule 23(b)(2), petitioners must show that the relevant
officials have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”360 In other words, “[t]he
key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or
declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it
can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members
or as to none of them.’”361 This test raises the same basic concerns for
COVID-19 habeas petitioners that can arise with regard to typicality and
adequacy: some individuals will be more suitable for a remedy like
release than others.362 The same issue can be said to apply to Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(3).363
Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)).
359. WRIGHT & MILLER, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1776.1 (3d ed.); see also Braggs v.
Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 667 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (“Rule 23(b)(2) has been liberally applied in the area of
civil rights, including suits challenging conditions and practices at various detention facilities.”).
360. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
361. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).
362. See, e.g., Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“The imperative of
individualized determinations, recognized by both sides in this case, makes this case inappropriate for
class treatment.”); Sabata v. Nebraska Dep't of Corr. Servs., 337 F.R.D. 215, 270 (D. Neb. 2020) (“The
Court believes that any potential differences in separate prosecutions resulting in different outcomes
would be attributable to the wide factual variations in individual inmates’ medical situations. Further, as
in Dukes, the Court is concerned that many members of the proposed class and subclasses have no claim
for the proposed injunctive relief.”).
363. Rule 23(b)(1) applies when “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of” either “(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct” for the defendants or “(B) adjudications with respect to individual
class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members . . .
or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Courts have observed that “Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions predominate, not that the action
include only common questions.” Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 484 (2d Cir. 2010).
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An answer to this counterargument is that all petitioners seek at least
some common relief, likely in the form of a declaratory judgment that the
prison officials have violated the Eighth Amendment as well as in the
form of injunctive relief in setting up a process that leads to release for
some and safer conditions for others.364 This situation will exist in a
number of paradigmatic class-action situations, such as where prisoners
with a common disease sue for access to a certain medical treatment.365
While they may not all end up qualifying for treatment, they are all
claiming at least an entitlement under the Eighth Amendment to be
considered for the treatment. The same logic holds in the COVID-19
context: even if some prisoners will not end up qualifying for release, they
are all claiming that they have been deprived of the consideration for such
release that is due under the Eighth Amendment. And they are likewise
all claiming a corresponding constitutional entitlement to be considered
for release on terms that comply with the Eighth Amendment.
D. Federalism, Comity, and Exhaustion
Lurking in the background of many of the COVID-19 cases (at least on
appeal) has been the concern that federal district courts might
unallowably “assume[] the role of ‘super-warden.’”366 These concerns
perhaps ring out differently when the facility involved is a state rather
than federal facility. In theory, they should not: the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel & Unusual Punishments clause applies equally to the States and to
the Federal Government.367 Nevertheless, federalism and comity
concerns have arisen when a state facility is under scrutiny.
364. See e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 746 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“Here, Respondents’
failure to make prompt and reasonable use of home confinement and compassionate release in light of the
pandemic which takes into account inmates’ age and medical conditions is applicable to each member of
the class so that injunctive relief is appropriate as to the class as a whole. Accordingly, the Court finds
Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied.”); see also Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 739 (E.D. Mich. 2020),
amended, No. 20-10829, 2020 WL 4818894 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2020) (“[T]he class seeks both a
determination of whether Defendants’ actions or failures to act in response to COVID-19 amount to
violations of civil detainees’ constitutional rights in the aggregate and declaratory relief setting forth the
minimum constitutional conditions of confinement. Such a declaration would be universally applicable;
an injunction ordering Defendants to reduce the detainee population at the Calhoun County Correctional
Facility, if necessary, would also apply to ‘all class members or . . . to none.’” (quoting Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011))).
365. E.g., Postawko v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:16-CV-04219, 2017 WL 3185155, at *14,
aff’d, 910 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2018).
366. See Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d
1159, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019); Prison Legal News v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 890 F.3d 954, 965 (11th
Cir. 2018)). Garrett and Kovarsky note the unfortunate echo in legal history that at least some COVID19 forms of relief “placed [federal] judges in precisely the receivership roles that . . . historically made
the Supreme Court uncomfortable,” yielding much of modern prison-conditions doctrine. See Garrett &
Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 56; see also id. at 44 & n.272,
367. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
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Sometimes, these concerns may motivate particularly strict
enforcement of exhaustion requirements.368 In the late nineteenth
century, this doctrine provided that “as a matter of comity, federal courts
should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state
courts have had an opportunity to act.”369 “Subsequent cases refined the
principle that state remedies must be exhausted except in unusual
circumstances,” with comity remaining the motivating influence.370
These same principles are reflected (albeit not to the exclusion of other
motives) in AEDPA’s provisions for challenging the validity of state
convictions and sentences371 as well as the PLRA,372 each of which make
exceptions when a state-court remedy is not “available.”373 Remedies are
not “available” when they “are alternatives to the standard review process
and where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies
in the past.”374
There are ample reasons to conclude that state remedies would not be
“available” for COVID-19 habeas claims, whether because of a mismatch
between slow state processes and a rapidly spreading virus,375 or because
state postconviction procedures do not allow for challenging the
execution or manner of a sentence in the way that § 2241 does. 376 For
example, in the litigation over Michigan’s Oakland County Jail, the
district court concluded that the Michigan law at issue did not “set forth a
remedy for inmates to pursue” and thus, even if a few had “obtained relief
through this mechanism,” it was not “part of the ‘standard review process’
and [was] not a remedy through which state courts ha[d] ‘provided relief
. . . in the past.’”377
368. Garrett and Kovarsky come to a related conclusion, observing that exhaustion requirements
arose as a common means for courts to dispatch cases without reaching more charged substantive and
remedial questions. See Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 28–29, 45–46, 52–53.
369. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251
(1886)).
370. Id.
371. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
373. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
847–48 (1999) (AEDPA); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016) (PLRA).
374. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844.
375. See Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 60 (2020) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from
denial of application to vacate stay) (“Given the speed at which the contagion spread, the 160-day
grievance process offered no realistic prospect of relief. In just 116 days, nearly 500 inmates contracted
COVID-19, leading to 74 hospitalizations and 19 deaths.”).
376. See also Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 437 (D. Conn. May 12, 2020)
(finding “undue prejudice” exception applies in context of suit over federal facility, FCI Danbury).
377. Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 768 (E.D. Mich.), vacated, 815 F. App’x 978
(6th Cir. 2020); see also Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 20-1469, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741, at *5 (6th
Cir. May 26, 2020). But see Cameron, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16741, at *19–21 (Bush, J., dissenting
from denial of stay).
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Nevertheless, exhaustion requirements have at times proven a
significant barrier. Staying the district court’s permanent injunction in
Valentine (the case involving the Texas “Pack Unit”), the Fifth Circuit
concluded that “Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies
before filing suit [was] fatal,” even though the district court had found
that the prison’s “grievance process was lengthy and unlikely to provide
necessary COVID-19 relief” and that, “[b]y all accounts, the process was
suboptimal.”378 In Swain (the case involving the Miami-Dade jail), the
Eleventh Circuit majority concluded that the district court had erred in
issuing a preliminary injunction by “refusing to consider the defendants’
arguments with respect to PLRA exhaustion.”379 As the dissent noted, the
majority arrived at this conclusion despite the fact that the prison officials’
brief in opposition had “included a scant two paragraphs of argument on
administrative exhaustion and no citations to the record” and instead tried
to incorporate by reference a lengthy motion “filed on a different briefing
schedule” to which the prisoners had not yet been able to respond—a
procedural maneuver that the Eleventh Circuit itself would never have
countenanced.380
Federalism and comity concerns arose in other doctrinal settings as
well. In staying the district court’s preliminary injunction in Valentine,
for example, the Fifth Circuit panel majority chided the district court for
mandating intensive intramural measures, stating that while these
requirements “may be salutary health measures,” their “level of
micromanagement, enforced upon threat of contempt, does not reflect the
principles of comity commanded by the PLRA.”381 In staying the
preliminary injunction in Swain, the majority deemed it irreparable harm
that the jail officials would “lose the discretion vested in them under state
law to allocate scarce resources among different county operations
necessary to fight the pandemic.”382
In denying a preliminary injunction in Money, the Illinois prisonsystem case, Judge Dow was even more direct while weighing the publicinterest factor in the analysis. He wrote that “[t]he public interest also

378. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2020). But see Valentine, 141 S.Ct. at 60
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay) (noting the absurdity of asking
prisoners facing COVID-19 risk to exhaust a “160-day grievance process” that “offered no realistic
prospect of relief” and pointing out that at least one prisoner, Alvin Norris, had “died before the prison
took any steps in response to his grievance”).
379. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2020).
380. Id. at 1302 (Martin, J., dissenting).
381. Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 806 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d
1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (finding irreparable harm to jail officials because, “[a]bsent a
stay, the defendants will lose the discretion vested in them under state law to allocate scarce resources
among different county operations necessary to fight the pandemic”).
382. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1090.
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commands respect for federalism and comity, which means that
courts must approach the entire enterprise of federal judicial intrusion into
the core activities of the state cautiously and with humility.”383 He noted
that the prisoners sought “a process that could result in the release of at
least 12,000 inmates,” or “almost one-third of the prison population in
Illinois.”384
The other side of this observation, of course, was that approximately
12,000 prisoners had “serious underlying medical conditions that put
them at particular risk of serious harm or death from COVID-19” and
were eligible for medical furlough under Illinois law.385 But in the Money
analysis, the scope of the danger became, at least in part, a weakness
rather than a strength for the prisoners’ case.
E. Preliminary vs. Final Relief
A final doctrinal tension in the COVID-19 habeas cases has concerned
the nature of the remedy—specifically, whether a district court is being
asked to grant (1) a preliminary release while a meritorious habeas case
proceeds, or (2) release as an ultimate remedy, vindicating a meritorious
habeas claim.386 At the heart of this tension is one of the most noteworthy
pieces of non-judicial writing in this set of cases: a declaration by
Professor Judith Resnik, discussing the federal courts’ somewhatforgotten “enlargement” power.387
The Resnik declaration spans fourteen pages. At its core is a discussion
of “the availability of provisional remedies,”388 and, specifically, “an
aspect of federal judicial power that is less well-known” called
“enlargement.”389 The declaration explains enlargement as a term unique
to the habeas context (though comparable in many ways to “bail”) that

383. Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
384. Id. at 1134; see also id. at 1128–29 (“Plaintiffs’ motion also raises serious concerns under
core principles of federalism and the separation of powers, especially given their request for sweeping
relief in the form of a mandatory injunction. . . . It is no accident that the federal judiciary only rarely
intrudes into the management of state prisons, and only once in history has actually ordered the release of
prisoners on a scale anywhere near what Plaintiffs hope to accomplish through this litigation.”).
385. Id. at 1115–16.
386. This question is distinct from whether the litigation itself is at the preliminary or final relief
stage — a judge can still grant, via a preliminary injunction, the same form of ultimate relief that will
become the permanent injunction. See, e.g., De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,
220 (1945). Separately, as Garrett and Kovarsky note, “much of the early decisional law developed in
preliminary procedural postures,” for example in litigation over preliminary injunctions or TROs. See
Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 25.
387. Declaration of Prof. Judith Resnik at 8, Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill.
2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02094), ECF No. 24-3 [hereinafter “Resnik Decl.”].
388. Id. at 7.
389. Id. at 8.
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denotes “a provisional remedy that modifies custody by expanding the
site in which it takes place.”390 “In some ways,” the declaration continues,
“enlargement resembles a prison furlough,” albeit one that “stems from
courts’ inherent powers.”391 It “provides an opportunity for increasing
the safety of prisoners, staff, and their communities while judges consider
a myriad of complex legal questions.”392
This form of relief is not the same as “a release order,” given that the
prisoner “remains in custody[,] even as the place of custody is changed
and thus ‘enlarged’ from a particular prison to a hospital, halfway house,
a person’s home, or other setting.”393 That distinction should—much as
its status as a habeas remedy should—exempt it from the PLRA’s
strictures.394
The declaration collects cases from nine federal circuits recognizing
this power, along with three others that at least arguably do so.395 Few of
these precedents come from the past thirty years; however, some of the
more recent cases cabin rather than expand this power. For example, in
1955, in Johnston v. Marsh,396 the Third Circuit dealt with a habeas
petition from an advanced diabetic hoping to “be admitted to bail pending
decision on the merits” because he was quickly going blind.397 The
district court granted an enlargement and the Third Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the trial court’s jurisdiction over the petition itself gave it
the power to act.398 Nearly four decades later, the same appellate court
reaffirmed this power, but emphasized that it was “limited” and
appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances.”399
At least a few district courts facing COVID-19 habeas litigation
rediscovered this power, though it has at times been ambiguous whether
they exercised it toward provisional ends, final ends, or both. In the
Elkton litigation, Judge Gwin’s (later-vacated) order granted “a

390. Id.
391. Id.; see also id. at 5, 9 (noting federal courts’ authority to manage habeas cases “as law and
justice requires” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243)).
392. Resnick Decl., supra note 389, at 8.
393. See, e.g., id.
394. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A), (g)(2); Resnik Decl. at 8.
395. See id. at 10 (primarily citing Woodcock v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 93, 43 (1st Cir. 1972); Mapp
v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001); Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992);
Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990);
Cherek v. United States, 767 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir.
1986); Pfaff v. Wells, 648 F.2d 689, 693 (10th Cir. 1981): and Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342, 1342-44
(D.C. Cir. 1969), and also citing Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Perkins, 53 F. App’x 667, 669 (4th Cir. 2002); and Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)).
396. 227 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1955).
397. Id. at 529.
398. See id. at 530–31.
399. Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/1

58

Zuckerman: When the Conditions are the Confinement: Eighth Amendment Habeas

2021]

WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE THE CONFINEMENT

59

preliminary injunction, in aid of its authority to grant enlargements,
ordering Respondents to determine the appropriate means of transferring
medically vulnerable subclass members out of Elkton.”400 In the Danbury
litigation, Judge Shea, responding to counsel’s characterization, treated
enlargement as “a process by which inmates would be evaluated promptly
for transfer to home confinement, with the urgency reflected in the
Attorney General’s April 3 memo.”401 In the Oakland County Jail
litigation, Judge Parker did not explicitly mention enlargement, but
instead referred to “bail” and “release on bond” for medically vulnerable
inmates.402
To some degree, the two kinds of relief converge on each other,
ouroboros-like, in the COVID-19 habeas posture: the paradigmatic
petitioner seeks to have his custody enlarged while his meritorious habeas
claim proceeds, but his habeas claim is meritorious because he has an
Eighth Amendment right to have his custody enlarged. This oddity
should not create significant difficulties for petitioners—if such relief is
permissible as a provisional remedy, which it undeniably is, then it
follows that it must also be permissible as a final remedy. 403 Nevertheless,
it may cause some doctrinal confusion, and appellate courts may wish to
define the nature of this relief more clearly for future petitioners. It would
make sense to clarify that enlargement itself, as the Resnik declaration
suggests, is a provisional remedy that—in unique and fast-moving
contexts like the COVID-19 pandemic—can support the equivalent final
remedy of (at least temporary) release.
F. Rights and Remedies
Though never addressed doctrinally, an additional tension that haunts
the COVID-19 cases is the long-running war between rights and
remedies: a series of battles that almost necessarily operate beneath the
surface.404 In theory, of course, constitutional law requires judges “to be
400. Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467, 474 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated, Wilson v. Williams,
961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
401. Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 416 n. 1 (D. Conn. 2020); see also id. at 416,
430–31 (discussing enlargement more as a final remedy than a provisional one).
402. Order at 6–7, Cameron, No. 2:20-cv-10949 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2020), D.E. 94, vacated,
Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).
403. Cf. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (“A preliminary
injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be
granted finally.”).
404. For some of the most prominent entries in this literature, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L.
REV. 633 (2006); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); and Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). See also,
e.g., Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term — Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
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detached from the political arena and to follow processes conducive to
reflection and reason.”405 This ideal of the judicial role reflects “the
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of
impersonal and reasoned judgments.”406 But this aspiration “is always
tempered by the reality it serves. . . . [C]ourts read the text illuminated by
the world outside judicial chambers.”407 If they do not, they will fail to
“generate assent to the norms that they affirm, or else life will corrode
their interpretations.”408
For that reason, rights and remedies are perpetually locked in combat:
“The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy—the recognition
that rights are not actual people in an actual world—makes it inevitable
that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds
will shuttle back and forth between right and remedy.”409 Professor Paul
Gewirtz chronicled this struggle in the school-desegregation cases,410 and
Professor Darryl Levinson has done the same for an array of contexts,
including prison litigation.411 In the prison-conditions context, Levinson
notes the trajectory of courts (especially the Supreme Court) responding
to “expansive district court structural reform” in earlier decades by
“curtail[ing] the scope of the right,” limiting the scope of the Eighth
Amendment such that it is violated in only the most extreme cases.412
These challenges become acute in any hot-button context, and the
crime-and-punishment context is no exception. The Fourth Amendment
1 (1979); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (1999); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 481–84 (2004); Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword:
Rights As Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 33 (2018); Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1414–21 (1988); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 (1991). Technically, this rights–
remedies dyad is an overgeneralization, as scholars have at times focused on the interplay between
justiciability and merits, between merits and remedies, or among all three. See Levinson, supra (merits
and remedies); Gewirtz, supra (same); Pierce, supra (justiciability and merits); Fallon, supra (all three).
I invoke it in the general sense closest to Fallon’s, to denote the way in which courts may “adjust or
manipulate applicable law,” regardless of its “doctrinal category,” based in part on concerns about
ultimate results. See Fallon, supra, at 637. Garrett and Kovarsky come to a similar conclusion in this
context, observing that judges in COVID-19 cases “often avoided intrusive relief by changing the way
crucial rights and remedies were defined and applied,” Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 44,
particularly in the context of habeas suits seeking release, id. at 45–46.
405. Gewirtz, supra note 404, at 677.
406. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
407. Gewirtz, supra note 404, at 677.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 679.
410. Id. at 609–28.
411. Levison, supra note 404, at 874–99; see also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 44 (noting
this same scholarly echo).
412. Levison, supra note 404, at 881 (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 338 (1981); and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).
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offers a paradigmatic example: looming over every search-and-seizure
case in the modern (post–Mapp v. Ohio413) era is the possibility that “[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”414 This
possibility creates a risk of bias, much like knowledge of an injury risks
biasing a jury in a negligence case.415 The special problem, as Professor
William Stuntz pointed out, is that “the ‘injury’ that triggers the
suppression hearing makes the claimant inherently unsympathetic.”416
“One of the prerequisites for the defendant’s fourth amendment claim—
the existence of suppressible evidence of crime—tends to suggest that the
defendant deserves punishment, not relief.”417
The same problem emerges in the COVID-19 prison context. Scholars
and society-members alike recognize that people confined to congregate
environments—whether cruise ships, nursing homes, or prisons and
jails—are at higher risk of infectious diseases like COVID-19.418 But the
advisability of taking cruises notwithstanding being trapped in only one
of these three environments “makes the claimant inherently
unsympathetic.”419 A prerequisite for being subject to this inordinate
risk—being locked in a prison or jail—“tends to suggest that the
[petitioner] deserves punishment, not relief.”420
A key difference is that the Eighth Amendment prohibits gratuitous
“inflictions of punishment”—the habeas petitioner has already had his
punishment meted out, and it is not the warden’s province to add more.421
Nevertheless, it does not take a sophisticated public-opinion analysis to
recognize that prisoners are not the most popular litigants, and judges
might have thought twice before allowing hundreds or even thousands of
prisoners to return home as a result of having been incarcerated during a
pandemic.422 That courts manifested willingness to grant such relief at all
413. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
414. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
415. Stuntz, supra note 404, at 911–12.
416. Id. at 912.
417. Id. This problem helps explain, Stuntz argued, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the ex ante
warrant requirement. Id. at 915–37, 942.
418. See supra note 329.
419. See Stuntz, supra note 404, at 912.
420. See id.
421. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).
422. It is possible that some judges also considered the specter of future money damages, though
to my knowledge the issue never came up in any of the litigation. After all, a ruling that officials had
violated the Eighth Amendment could have future issue preclusive—and even nonmutually issuepreclusive—effects. See generally B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148, 135 S. Ct.
1293, 1303 (2015); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–33 (1979). A damages action along
these lines would almost inevitably trigger questions about the scope of Heck bar, at least as sometimes
phrased by the Supreme Court, given its practical effect on the “length of” a sentence. See Nelson v.
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004) (“[A] § 1983 suit for damages that would ‘necessarily imply’ the
invalidity of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length of an
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speaks both to the value of an independent judiciary, and to the vitality of
constitutional norms that protect even the most marginalized.423
Nonetheless, the overall picture painted by the COVID-19 cases—
which unfolded while prisoners contracted the illness at staggering rates,
leading to numerous deaths424—is a grim one. As Dolovich notes, only
two cases involving prisons or jails ended especially favorably, and even
those yielded limited releases.425 The carceral facilities from which
litigants had even tentative success, tended to be lower-security
facilities,426 civil immigration detention facilities,427 prisons “for the
elderly and the infirm,”428 or jails with pretrial detainees (that is, legally
innocent petitioners).429 Notably, Garrett and Kovarsky suggest that
perceived “safety risk” to society at large may “explain the relative
litigation success enjoyed by ICE detainees and the relative failures
experienced by those in custody because they were convicted of
crimes.”430 Similar concerns may also account for courts’ relative greater
willingness “to order individualized release in certain cases,” though this

inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable
termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” (quoting Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997))). The language of
Heck itself, however, suggests that there should be no bar, as these kinds of claims have nothing to do
with the underlying criminal judgment. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“[I]f the district court determines that
the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar
to the suit.” (footnotes omitted)).
423. Cf. RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 105 (2019) (tracing mass incarceration
“to the shift from leaving judgments to professionals to allowing the masses to set policies directly”). But
cf. Rebecca Goldstein, Book Review, The Politics of Decarceration, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 448–49 (2019)
(arguing that public opinion can by the same token advance reform and decarceration).
424. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
426. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2020); Martinez-Brooks v. Easter,
459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 418 (D. Conn. 2020); Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
Any correlation here may be a function of carceral architecture, given that such facilities tend to use
dormitory-style housing that makes transmission of a disease like COVID-19 especially serious. See
supra note 340 and accompanying text. It is also possible that it could have stemmed from decisions
made by lawyers, who — perhaps figuring on an uphill climb to begin with — could have been
unconsciously predisposed to more sympathetic plaintiffs. Cf. Marie-Amelie George, The LGBT
Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 559 (2018)
(“Movement lawyers choose sympathetic plaintiffs, rather than representative ones, which can sow
dissent.”); Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 306 n. 340 (1988) (“Indeed,
emphasis upon a traditional plaintiff can focus the court’s attention too sharply on his circumstances rather
than on the more general need for relief, as public interest lawyers know when they seek sympathetic
plaintiffs for test cases.”).
427. E.g., Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
428. Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 2020).
429. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020).
430. Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 59.
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willingness was also quite sparing.431
Nevertheless, even in the low-security context, the concern remained
that courts might just “dump inmates out into the streets.”432 Meanwhile,
less sympathetic prisoners were without question also highly menaced by
COVID-19, and the nature of their crimes did not go unnoticed. As Judge
Dow observed in Money:
Plaintiffs seek a process that could result in the release of at least 12,000
inmates. That is almost one-third of the prison population in Illinois. All
of them are incarcerated because a jury convicted them of committing
crimes, including some of the most serious crimes against our community.
Many of them are violent offenders. Compelling a process to potentially
release thousands of inmates on an expedited basis could pose a serious
threat to public safety and welfare. The risk of recidivism comes into play,
as do concerns about victims’ rights. The question is not simply what is
best for the inmates—the public has vital interests at stake, too.433

While none of the litigants had, in fact, asked for the prison gates to be
swung open, the tenor of many COVID-19 cases still indicated “a fear of
too much justice.”434 There was little epistemic question that the
situations were perilous or that truly effective prophylaxis was impossible
inside the prison walls; few doubted that a lot of men (and no small
number of women) were being left inside to take their chances with death,
under the kinds of circumstances that the rest of society was doing
everything in its power to avoid.435 Nevertheless, calling that situation a
violation of the Eighth Amendment would have triggered a daunting
remedial obligation. Instead, the Eighth Amendment receded. Like
notable prison cases that preceded them, the COVID-19 cases offered
“further examples of remedies driving rights, rather than the other way
around.”436
IV. PATHS FORWARD
The classic law review Article introduces a problem; details its roots,
431. See id. at 60.
432. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467, 480 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (emphasizing that
this was not what petitioners were seeking), vacated, Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
433. Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 2020); see also id. at 1111 (“The
named Plaintiffs are ten individuals convicted of a range of felonies, including murder, aggravated
kidnapping, and attempted robbery.”); id. at 1127 (“it is important to bear in mind that some portion of
the incarcerated population has been convicted of the most serious crimes — murder, rape, domestic
battery, and so on. Seven of the ten named Plaintiffs in fact are serving time for murder.”).
434. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
435. Cf. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 165 (5th Cir. 2020) (admitting that “[a]s a matter of
policy, TDCJ could have done more to protect vulnerable inmates in the Pack Unit” and that “TDCJ’s
measures may have been unsuccessful” even if they “were not unconstitutional”).
436. Levinson, supra note 404, at 882.
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seams, and contours; and then concludes with some fresh, crisp
suggestions for a resolution. The COVID-19 cases do not fit well into the
final act of that neat procession. There was, after all, authority to release
prisoners to safer forms of custody—indeed, Attorney General Barr had
encouraged its vigorous use.437 The courts, too, had power.438 Lawyers
were available to bring claims. The danger was as well-documented and
recognized as a problem could be: for the core period of these lawsuits,
the COVID-19 pandemic was practically the only news around. And
indeed, the first major story to interrupt the pandemic’s full-saturation of
cultural consciousness centered on racial injustice in U.S. law
enforcement439—hardly a diminishment of the poignancy of the COVID19 petitioners’ and putative class members’ plight, given that a
disproportionate number of them were people of color struggling within
the downstream version of the same criminal-justice system.
Nevertheless, the overall results from the COVID-19 cases suggest that
large segments of America’s carceral system failed this stress test.440
Despite positive, proactive efforts in some jurisdictions, a lot of
prisoners—and a lot of legally innocent pretrial detainees—were left
inside facilities where infection was likely and social distancing
impossible. In a year in which Americans as a whole fared poorly with
COVID-19, prisoners—people whose health and “general well-being”
society has assumed additional “responsibility for” by holding them
involuntarily behind bars441—fared worse still.442 And the principal
deficiency does not appear to have been tools but rather will.
Still, significant improvements could be made to the tools available.
The most straightforward improvement, which some state legislatures
have been debating,443 would be to institute legislation at the state and
federal levels that would empower judges to pause or revisit prison
sentences on an individual or class-wide basis when a public-health
emergency has been declared at a given facility. Effectively, such a
statute would authorize judges to reduce a sentence, grant bail, and/or stay
a sentence until the danger has abated. Such legislation would shore up
the “enlargement” authority that federal judges, at least in most circuits,

437. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
438. See supra Sections I.C, III.A.
439. See generally Helier Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This
Time, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905.
440. See also Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 3 (“Every outbreak at a detention center is a
public health crisis; together, they represent a national catastrophe that forced courts to consider the healthprotective rights of detainees during emergencies. The results are not encouraging.”).
441. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989).
442. See supra note 12.
443. See generally Ghandnoosh, supra note 46.
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possess once a meritorious habeas claim has been brought.444 Of course,
judges themselves could simply acknowledge and act on this power—but
explicit statutory authority (and implicit support from a coequal branch of
government) would not hurt.
Legislative bodies could also help by making clear that exhaustion is
not required—or that administrative remedies are not “available”—in the
face of an emergency that urgently threatens the health of incarcerated
people.445
In addition, as others have noted, they could update their
states’ “good time” policies to foster another “simple, equitable way of
getting lots of people out of prison safely, rather than continuing to
incarcerate them in ever more dangerous and cruel conditions.”446
Transparency regarding the actual conditions of incarceration may help
too, as Dolovich argues.447 Indeed, a video leaked out of Elkton by an
unknown prisoner generated significant public attention to the plight of
prisoners there, which in turn may have helped spur Ohio Governor Mike
DeWine to authorize the Ohio National Guard to provide assistance.448 It
is possible, as many have suggested, that if the public really knew how
bleak things were inside some of these facilities—through mandatory
reporting, public oversight bodies, or greater press access—they would
immediately demand change.449
Certainly, such transparency cannot hurt. We at least ought to know
what is actually being done on our behalf. Public officials lock away in
government compounds not just the tiny fraction of people who have
committed the most heinous offenses we can imagine but also the much
larger number of people who have committed all sorts of lesser offenses.
These people are locked away in crowded, chaotic, often unsanitary
facilities, where social distancing is impossible, because of both
institutional design and the sheer number of human beings packed into
one space. Such confinement is harmful and unnecessary, and it includes
a cruel irony in the pandemic context, which is that the contagion risks
are often worst for the lowest-security prisoners—those who, like the
prisoners at Elkton, are deemed to pose a low-enough risk that they are
444. See supra Sections III.A, III.E.
445. See supra Section III.D. Again, as with the enlargement authority, courts could simply
recognize these exceptions in existing law.
446. See Emily Widra & Wanda Bertram, More States Need to Use Their “Good Time” Systems
to Get People out of Prison During COVID-19, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/01/12/good-time/.
447. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 30–34.
448. See Ali Gostanian, Video Shows Inmate Pleading for Help Inside Ohio Federal Prison, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/live-blog/2020-04-08coronavirus-news-n1178891/ncrd1179476#blogHeader; see also Dolovich, supra note 1, at 10 n.17, 13.
449. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Assuming
knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in
my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

65

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1

66

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

warehoused in open-bay dormitories rather than the locked cells that
people often see on TV shows.450 Many of these prisoners are elderly and
infirm,451 having long aged-out of any propensity to commit crimes.452
They remain locked away nonetheless.
While some who advocate on behalf of prisoners do so because they
have been “inspired by the notion of a preferential option for the poor,”453
no one in the COVID-19 cases was asking for the prisoners to be more
protected from COVID-19 than anyone else. The crux of the cases was
that, while being imprisoned in this country is rarely healthful, the nature
of incarceration within these facilities during a pandemic like COVID-19
raised the punishment to a level that could not comport with the Eighth
Amendment. Prisoners sought relief from the federal courts to blunt a
dramatic disparity: conditions making them substantially more likely to
die than everyone else.454 The relief they sought would have benefited
not just them and their families, but also prison staff, who also deserve to
work under safe and humane conditions.455
Last, but certainly not least, prisoners and lawyers who advocate on
their behalf can learn from what happened in 2020. Though the legal
precedents that the COVID-19 cases generated are mostly dispiriting,
there are possibilities for successful litigation efforts. The ability of
prisoners, in at least some jurisdictions, to bring § 2241 habeas claims
asserting that “no set of conditions would be constitutionally sufficient”456
will allow prisoners to overcome the PLRA’s often-formidable barrier to
the courthouse doors. And while class-wide procedures would be
efficient for such claims, they are not required: prisoners facing
particularly extreme health risks at carceral facilities that are unable to
protect them (and their attorneys) could bring these as individual claims
as well.
We will likely face another pandemic before too long.457 I hope that
450. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
451. See Li & Lewis, supra note 15.
452. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–472 (2012); Carl Zimmer, You’re An Adult.
Your
Brain,
Not
So
Much.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/science/youre-an-adult-your-brain-not-so-much.html.
453. Cf. Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau, Rethinking Health and Human Rights: Time for a
Paradigm Shift, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655, 662 (2002).
454. See supra note 12.
455. Cf. Shane Hoover, Elkton Prison Union Chief Talks Coronavirus [E]ffect on Staff,
TIMESREPORTER.COM (Apr. 9, 2020, 5:32 AM), https://www.timesreporter.com/news/20200409/elktonprison-union-chief-talks-coronavirus-affect-on-staff (quoting union president representing Elkton
employees as saying that there was “anger from the staff here,” as well as “angst, anxiety because their
story isn’t out there and they feel as if the Bureau of Prisons is doing nothing to help their first-line staff
members”).
456. E.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020).
457. E.g., Melissa Davey, WHO Warns Covid-19 Pandemic Is ‘Not Necessarily the Big One,’ THE
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this Article will be helpful to incarcerated people and their advocates in
the unhappy event that we do. More importantly, I hope that by then we
will have changed our system of criminal adjudication and incarceration
enough so that we will not again force the people who live and work in
this country’s carceral facilities to face so much unnecessary infection and
death.

Guardian (Dec. 29, 2020, 1:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/29/who-warns-covid19-pandemic-is-not-necessarily-the-big-one; Leslie Hook, The Next Pandemic: Where Is It Coming From
and How Do We Stop It?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2a80e4a2-7fb94e2c-9769-bc0d98382a5c.
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